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Explanation of Dissertation Format 
This dissertation will consist of three sections representing separate research 
efforts in economics. Each section is internally complete in that they contain their own 
introduction, problem statement, methodology, conclusions, and references. The sections 
are distinct in the sense that there is no central theme tying the research topics together. 
Each section represents an economic analysis conducted by the author to examine aspects 
of economic theory, or to empirically evaluate problems using econometric methods. The 
candidate has been the principal analyst in each of the papers in that the problem 
formulation, literature review, and analytical approach were done by the candidate. In the 
first section paper, the entire empirical analysis, including data calculation, model 
simulation, and interpretation of the model simulation results was completed by the 
candidate within the framework of a standing world wheat model. In the third section 
paper, the problem formulation, literature review, the research proposal, and the empirical 
analysis were initiated by the candidate. 
The Impact of the U.S. Wheat Export Enhancement Program on the World Wheat Market 
U.S. wheat exports declined significantly from a peak level of 48.2 million metric 
tons (MMT) in crop year 1981/82 to 25.2 MMT in 1985/86. In addition, the value of 
export index for U.S. wheat declined by 45 percent over the same period (USDA,FAS). 
The reasons for this dramatic decline were generally attributed to (a) the appreciation of 
the U.S. dollar, (b) debt problems of developing countries, (c) slow income growth in many 
importing countries, (d) legislated loan rate levels for wheat in the U.S. that caused a 
significant increase in U.S. government stocks and provided a high price floor for other 
exporters, and (e) unfair export subsidization by competing wheat exporters (USGAO, 
1988). The dramatic reversal of export value and volume after a decade of steady growth 
was a significant factor in the design of the Food Security Act of 1985. This act, covering 
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crop years 1986/87 to 1990/91, included, inter alia, significant reductions in U.S. 
Commodity Credit Corporation loan rates, high target prices to support U.S. farm income, 
acreage reduction programs to control domestic production, and the Export Enhancement 
Program (EEP) to provide export subsidies to certain importing countries to increase 
exports and remove excess commodity stocks. 
The EEP program was announced in May 1985 and later included in the 1985 act. 
The specific objectives of the EEP, as specified in the 1985 Act, are (1) to make U.S. 
exports more competitive in the world market and (2) to offset the adverse effects on U.S. 
exports due to: (a) unfair trade practices or subsidies by exporters, (b) U.S. price supports 
that are above competitors' prices, and (c) fluctuation in exchange rates. This program 
mandated the United States Department of Agriculture (USD A) to utilize a minimum of 
$1 billion to subsidize U.S. agricultural exports. Under this program about $2.9 billion has 
been allocated to subsidize U.S. agricultural exports through fiscal year (FY) 1990 (as of 
June 1989). Under the provisions of this program, export subsidies (bonuses) are offered 
to exporting firms that sell commodities to the targeted countries. With this program, the 
U.S. is able to increase exports by directly competing with the export subsidies offered by 
the European Economic Community, concentrating on the markets currently held by the 
EEC. 
The EEP has played a large role in the U.S. wheat export program, being applied 
to 70 percent of U.S. wheat exports in 1987/88 and a projected 60 percent in 1988/89. By 
June 1989, a total of 61.0 MMT of U.S. wheat has been sold under the Export 
Enhancement Program at an estimated average subsidy of $29 per tonne. The EEP has 
been used to subsidize wheat sales in 26 importing countries with major importers 
including the USSR (17.4 MMT), China (12.3 MMT), Egypt (6.1 MMT), Algeria (5.2 
MMT), Morocco (4.2 MMT), India (2.0 MMT), Poland (2.0 MMT), Iraq (2.0 MMT), the 
Philippines (1.8 MMT), and Tunisia (1.1 MMT). 
Recent studies by the U.S. General Accounting Office (1987) and Bailey (1988) 
have analyzed the net impact of the wheat EEP in terms of additionality and cost 
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effectiveness. Bailey (1988), in particular, found that the net result of EEP in 1987/88 was 
displacement of commercial sales (90 percent), with only 10 percent additionality. Oleson 
(1987) concluded that U.S. wheat exports have not responded such that the EEP is 
justifiable from an export value basis. Although, the increase in U.S. exports is only one 
objective of the EEP, the analysis of effectiveness of the EEP in this regard is necessary in 
understanding the recent world wheat trade markets. 
Since the implementation of the 1985 Act, U.S. wheat exports have increased 
significantly from 25.0 MMT in crop year 1985/86 to 43.3 MMT in 1987/88. This increase 
in U.S. wheat exports is attributed to many factors, including (a) low yields due to drought 
in major wheat exporting countries; (b) large increases in import demand by the Soviet 
Union, the People's Republic of China, and Eastern Europe; (c) depreciation of the U.S. 
dollar; (d) the lower wheat loan rate legislated in the 1985 Act; and (e) increased wheat 
purchases by some importers whose imports are subsidized through the EEP (Bailey, 
1989). From the trade and domestic policies perspectives, it is important to isolate the 
effect of the EEP from other factors that have influenced U.S. wheat exports and the world 
wheat market. 
Abbott, Paarlberg and Sharpies (1987) demonstrated that targeted export subsidies 
can increase the welfare of an exporting country by exploiting differences in price 
elasticities of import demands. Using a spatial equilibrium model of the world wheat 
market they show that, if only the U.S. exercises market power, small targeted subsidies 
may enhance U.S. welfare. Abbott et al note that retaliatory responses by competing 
exporters are likely to reduce the efficacy of targeted subsidies. Recent studies of the 
effect of the EEP on the world wheat market by Hillberg (1988) and Haley (1988) also 
make the assumption of no response by other exporters to U.S. targeted subsidies. Bailey 
(1988, 1989) analyzed the EEP using the conjecture that the EEC and Argentina 
responded to the EEP with export price reductions, while Canada and Australia acted 
passively. This paper analyzes the impact of the wheat EEP using the conjecture of 
competitive price response by all other exporters. This is an important conceptual 
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difference since the theoretical basis for welfare improvement through targeted export 
subsidies is not well established for cases where retaliatory pricing behavior of other 
exporters is allowed. This assumption will capture the world wheat market more accurately 
as evidenced by U.S. competitors' actual responses to the EEP (Roberts and Love, 1989). 
The incorporation of full competitive price response of other exporters to the EEP 
distinguishes this paper from earlier studies. 
The specific objectives of this study are (i) to analyze the impact of the wheat EEP 
on U.S. wheat exports, trade share, and Gulf port price; (ii) to evaluate the effect of the 
wheat EEP on the displacement of U.S. commercial sales; and (iii) to analyze the effect 
of the wheat EEP on competing exporters' wheat exports and trade shares. 
Export Allocation and Price Discrimination Policies Under Demand Uncertainty 
It is well known that, in the absence of externalities, a large country can improve 
welfare through an optimal tariff on imports or an equivalent export tax and that an export 
subsidy is welfare reducing. Despite this theoretical result, export subsidies are widely used 
in many developed countries. Recently, Abbott, Paarlberg and Sharpies (1987) 
demonstrated that targeted export subsidies can increase welfare of an exporting country 
by exploiting differences in price elasticities of import demands. Specifically, they 
suggested that, when export taxes are forbidden, export subsidies be targeted to markets 
with more elastic import demands. Similarly, Dutton (1990) provided a rationale for 
widespread use of export subsidies. He showed that when taxes to some countries are 
constrained to suboptimal levels, export subsidies to other importers can improve welfare 
of the exporter. 
Although domestic supply and demand are realized at the end of production 
period, import demands in some foreign markets may be subject to random shifts. 
Uncertainty in foreign import demands are an important cause of export earnings 
instability in both developed and developing countries. Keynes (1942) regarded the wide 
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and rapid fluctuations in the world prices of primary products as one of the greatest "evils" 
in trade and campaigned for international cooperation for regulating primary commodity 
prices. In the absence of international cooperation, a large country may exercise market 
power to set export prices. For example, Dutton (1990) argued that targeted export 
subsidies may be used as an exercise of market power. 
Since the literature focused on how different price elasticities of foreign import 
demands affect export subsidies, the effects of risks in foreign markets on export pricing 
policies have yet to be investigated. In a seminal paper. Young and Anderson (1982) 
investigated optimal tariff and quantity setting policies for an importable good. They 
showed that the ranking of ex ante policies depends crucially on how closely the domestic 
price of the traded good under alternative policies approximates the optimal 
state-contingent price. 
This paper investigates optimal export allocation and price discrimination policies 
of a government that disposes of a fixed quantity of surplus output in two foreign markets 
with random import demands. While the literature emphasized different price elasticities 
of foreign import demands, we show that risk is an important reason for price 
discrimination for foreign disposal of surplus outputs even when the exporter is risk 
neutral. This paper extends the literature on optimal trade policies in two important 
respects. First, we extend the multicountry model of Abbott, Paarlberg and Sharpies 
(1987) and Dutton (1990) and investigate how risk affects optimal price and quantity 
setting policies for foreign disposal of surplus outputs. Second, while conventional theories 
focused on optimal trade restricting policies, we employ Young and Anderson's (1982) 
framework and investigate the ranking of export promoting policies. 
This paper investigates price discrimination policies for a large country disposing 
of a fixed quantity of output to a certain and an uncertain market. In addition to price 
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elasticities of demand, risk is an important reason for price discrimination. A risk neutral 
government sets a higher price in the uncertain market than under certainty, but the effect 
of increased risk aversion is ambiguous. When exports are allocated ex ante, the risk 
neutral exporter allocates more output in the riskless market than under certainty. The 
ranking of price and quantity setting policies for foreign disposal of surplus output is 
generally ambiguous. 
An Analysis of Producer Participation in Government Commodity Programs 
Most major agricultural commodities produced in the United States are regulated 
by a variety of policy instruments that impact on production and marketing decisions. 
These include price and income support policies and production control polices which 
generally elicit different responses by individual producers and different responses at an 
aggregate level. Agricultural commodity programs in the United States may significantly 
affect input and output decisions of each crop as well as the mix of commodities produced. 
A distinctive feature of U.S. agricultural commodity programs is that price support 
storage programs and acreage restriction programs are voluntary and not all producers 
participate in the programs. The participation decision of producers may be very sensitive 
to policy parameters and is thus a critical component for explaining individual and 
aggregate supply response of commodities. Recent analyses of the affect of government 
•ft 
programs on agricultural supply response has focused on micro-based producer 
participation decision models (Houck et al., 1976; Lee and Helmberger, 1985; Periy et ai., 
1989; deGorter and Fisher, 1989). These studies have focused on the affect of government 
programs on a "representative producer" who will decide to either participate or not 
participate on the basis of which choice will lead to higher net profit (Lee and 
Helmberger). The heterogeneity of producers which distinguishes participants from non-
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participants has been attributed to different risk attitudes (Kramer and Pope, 1981; Chavas 
and Holt, 1990), dispersion of price expectations among producers (Pope, 1981), 
differences inproduction technologies betweenfarms (Lee and Helmberger, 1985; Whalley 
and Wigle, 1989), differences in attributes of land (Rausser, Zilberman and Just, 1984; 
Antle and Just, 1989) and differences in commodity "base acreage" between farms 
(deGorter and Fisher, 1989). Other farm attributes such as absolute farm size, crop 
rotations, and average farm yields relative to "program yields" may be significant factors 
in the program participation decision. 
The main objective of this paper is to establish the microeconomics of commodity 
supply under voluntary program participation. The theoretical model developed explicitly 
allows for differences in land attributes within a farm and between farms. The paper 
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THE IMPACT OF THE U.S. WHEAT EXPORT ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM 
ON TOE WORLD WHEAT MARKET 
by 
H. G. Brooks, S. Devadoss, and W. H. Meyers 
1990 
Department of Economics 




The U.S. Export Enhancement Program (EEP) was included in the 1985 U.S. 
Food Security Act with a major objective being to increase sales of U.S. agricultural 
commodities. Through the EEP, the U.S. government subsidizes exports of agricultural 
commodities to targeted importing countries. The EEP was applied to the majority of 
U.S. wheat sales in 1987/88 and 1988/89. Coincident with the 1985 act and EEP 
legislation, U.S. wheat exports have increased significantly. This study uses a 
nonspatial, partial equilibrium model of world wheat trade to analyze the impact of the 
EEP on U.S. wheat exports and share of world wheat trade. The study indicates that 
the effect of the EEP on the wheat market over the period 1986/87 to 1988/89 has 
been a large displacement of commercial wheat sales (87-92%), with export 
additionality due to the EEP being only 8-13%. The impact of the EEP on other 
exporters' wheat trade and importer demand has been small relative to the magnitude 
of total EEP sales. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
U,S, wheat exports declined significantly from a peak level of 48.2 million 
metric tons (MMT) in crop year 1981/82 to 25.2 MMT in 1985/86. In addition, the 
value of export index for U.S. wheat declined by 45 percent over the same period.^ The 
reasons for this dramatic decline were generally attributed to (a) the appreciation of the 
U.S. dollar, (b) debt problems of developing countries, (c) slow income growth in many 
importing countries, (d) legislated loan rate levels for wheat in the U.S. that caused a 
significant increase in U.S. government stocks and provided a high price floor for other 
exporters, and (e) unfair export subsidization by competing wheat exporters (USGAO, 
1988). The dramatic reversal of export value and volume after a decade of steady 
growth was a significant factor in the design of the Food Security Act of 1985. This act, 
covering crop years 1986/87 to 1990/91, included, inter alia, significant reductions in 
U.S. Commodity Credit Corporation loan rates, high target prices to support U.S. farm 
income, acreage reduction programs to control domestic production, and the Export 
Enhancement Program (EEP) to provide export subsidies to certain importing 
countries to increase exports and remove excess commodity stocks. 
Since the implementation of the 1985 Act, U.S. wheat exports have increased 
significantly from 25.0 MMT in crop year 1985/86 to 43.3 MMT in 1987/88. This 
increase in U.S. wheat exports is attributed to many factors, including (a) low yields due 
to drought in major wheat exporting countries; (b) large increases in import demand by 
the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and Eastern Europe; (c) depreciation 
of the U.S. dollar; (d) the lower wheat loan rate legislated in the 1985 Act; and (e) 
increased wheat purchases by some importers whose imports are subsidized through the 
EEP (Bailey, 1989). From the trade and domestic policies perspectives, it is important 
to isolate the effect of the ÉEP from other factors that have influenced U.S. wheat 
exports and the world wheat market. 
Abbott, Paarlberg and Sharpies (1987) demonstrated that targeted export 
subsidies can increase the welfare of an exporting country by exploiting differences in 
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price elasticities of import demands. Using a spatial equilibrium model of the world 
wheat market they show that, if only the U.S. exercises market power, small targeted 
subsidies may enhance U.S. welfare. Abbott et al. note that retaliatory responses by 
competing exporters are likely to reduce the efficacy of targeted subsidies. Recent 
studies of the effect of the EEP on the world wheat market by Hillberg (1988) and 
Haley (1988) also make the assumption of no response by other exporters to U.S. 
targeted subsidies.^ Bailey (1988,1989) analyzed the EEP using the conjecture that the 
EEC and Argentina responded to the EEP with export price reductions, while Canada 
and Australia acted passively. This paper analyzes the impact of the wheat EEP using 
the conjecture of competitive price response by all other exporters. This is an 
important conceptual difference since the theoretical basis for welfare improvement 
through targeted export subsidies is not well established for cases where retaliatory 
pricing behavior of other exporters is allowed. This assumption will capture the world 
wheat market more accurately as evidenced by U.S. competitors' actual responses to 
the EEP (Roberts and Love, 1989). The incorporation of full competitive price 
response of other exporters to the EEP distinguishes this paper from earlier studies. 
The specific objectives of this study are (i) to analyze the impact of the wheat 
EEP on U.S. wheat exports, trade share, and Gulf port price; (ii) to evaluate the effect 
of the wheat EEP on the displacement of U.S. commercial sales; and (iii) to analyze the 
effect of the wheat EEP on competing exporters' wheat exports and trade shares. 
The organization of this study is as follows. In the next section, a brief 
description of the Export Enhancement Program is given. In Section 3, the structure 
and components of the world wheat trade model used in this study are explained. A 
detailed discussion of the theoretical analysis of incorporating the EEP in the world 
wheat trade model is also provided in this section. In Section 4, empirical issues in 
incorporating the EEP in the model are discussed. In Section 5, the impacts of the EEP 
on the U.S. and the world wheat markets are presented. The final section describes 
conclusions and limitations of this study. 
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2. THE EXPORT ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM 
The EE? program was amiounced in May 1985 and later included in the 1985 
act. The criteria, as stated by the Foreign Agricultural Service of USDA, for evaluating 
sales under the EE? were: 
a) Additionalitv: Sales must increase U.S. agricultural exports above what 
would have occurred in the absence of the program. 
b) Targeting: Sales will be targeted to specific market opportunities, especially 
those that challenge competitors that subsidize exports. 
c) Cost Effectiveness: Sales should result in a net gain to the overall economy. 
d) Budget Neutrality: Sales should not increase the budget outlays beyond 
what would have occurred in the absence of a program. 
The specific objectives of the EEP, as specified in the 1985 Act, are (1) to make 
U.S. exports more competitive in the world market and (2) to offset the adverse effects 
on U.S. exports due to: (a) unfair trade practices or subsidies by exporters, (b) U.S. 
price supports that are above competitors' prices, and (c) fluctuation in exchange rates. 
This program mandated the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) to 
utilize a minimum of $1 billion to subsidize U.S. agricultural exports. Under this 
program about $2.9 billion has been allocated to subsidize U.S. agricultural exports 
through fiscal year (FY) 1990 (as of June 1989). Under the provisions of this program, 
export subsidies (bonuses) are offered to exporting firms that sell commodities to the 
targeted countries. With this program, the U.S. is able to increase exports by directly 
competing with the export subsidies offered by the European Economic Community, 
concentrating on the markets currently held by the EEC. 
The EEP has played a large role in the U.S. wheat export program, being 
applied to 70 percent of U.S. wheat exports in 1987/88 and a projected 60 percent in 
1988/89 (USDA World Grain Situation and Outlook, February 1989). By June 1989, a 
total of 61.0 MMT of U.S. wheat has been sold under the Export Enhancement 
Program at an estimated average subsidy of $29 per tonne. The EEP has been used to 
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subsidize wheat sales in 26 importing countries with major importers including the 
USSR (17.4 MMT), China (12.3 MMT), Egypt (6.1 MMT), Algeria (5.2 MMT), 
Morocco (4.2 MMT), India (2.0 MMT), Poland (2.0 MMT), Iraq (2.0 MMT), the 
Philippines (1.8 MMT), and Tunisia (1.1 MMT). 
Recent studies by the U.S. General Accounting Office (1987) and Bailey (1988) 
have analyzed the net impact of the wheat EEP in terms of additionality and cost 
effectiveness. Bailey (1988), in particular, found that the net result of EEP in 1987/88 
was displacement of commercial sales (90 percent), with only 10 percent additionality. 
Oleson (1987) concluded that U.S. wheat exports have not responded such that the EEP 
is justifiable from an export value basis. Although, the increase in U.S. exports is only 
one objective of the EEP, the analysis of effectiveness of the EEP in this regard is 
necessary in understanding the recent world wheat trade markets. 
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3. THE METHODOLOGY 
In this section, the structure and components of the world wheat trade model 
are explained and a theoretical analysis of EEP is presented. 
3.1 The Structure and Components of the World Wheat Trade Model 
The wheat trade model is a nonspatial partial equilibrium model of trade and, 
as such, does not model trade flows between specific regions or cross commodity 
impacts on the wheat sector. The model is dynamic and determines the trade 
equilibrium through price adjustments to clear excess supply and demands. The model 
contains 19 country/regional submodels and market clearing conditions. Wheat 
exporters modeled include the United States, Canada, the EEC-12, Australia, and 
Argentina. Major importers modeled include the USSR, the People's Republic of 
China, India, Japan, Algeria, Brazil, Eastern Europe, Egypt, Mexico, Morocco, Tunisia, 
other Africa and Middle East, other Asia, and other Latin America. The model thus 
includes detailed specification of the major markets affected by the EEP. 
The basic elements of a nonspatial, partial equilibrium supply and demand 
model are illustrated in Figure 1. The U.S. export supply curve (ESUS) is the 
difference between domestic supply (SUS) and demand (DUS) in the United States, 
which represents the quantity supplied in the world market at various price levels. 
Other exporters' supply and demand schedules are given in the lower panel. The curve 
ESQ is the combined excess supply of all competing exporters, which is derived as the 
difference between the supply and the demand of all competing exporters. The import 
demand schedule (EDT) of all importers is their total demand minus total supply. 
Other competitors' export supply and importers' import demand are represented in the 
top panel, third diagram from the left. The export demand schedule (EDN) facing the 
United States is the difference between the import demand of all importers and the 
export supply of competitors. The kinked, less elastic nature of the EDN results from 
the restricted trade policies pursued by some foreign countries, which insulate domestic 
prices from variability of outside market prices (see below for details). A trade 
US. US. Foreign Japan 
Trade Net Trade 
SM, SUS, ESO P P SM ESUS, 
SM, 
DM, DUS EDN EDT 
ysx ESO P SX 




Figure I. Determination of Equilibrium Prices and Quantities in the Wheat Trade Model 
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equilibrium is allowed by the clearing of excess demands and supplies generated within 
each region. The model defines the degree of price transmission of world market 
conditions into each regional submodel through a price linkage equation. The algebraic 
forms of the necessary components of the model are given below. 
m 
EDT = 2 [FpDi(PDi, X^) + FEDiCPD^, + SDi(PDi, X,,)  -  SU,(PS„ X, ,)]  
1 
i = 1,..., m importers (1) 
ESO = 2 [(SUj(PSj, X*j) - (FODj(PDj, X^) + FEDj(PDj, X,,)  + SDj(PDj, X,,))]  
j = 1,..., n other exporters (2) 
ESUS = SU,(P„, XJ - [FOD„(P„, XiJ + FED„(P„, XJ + SD„(P„, XgJKS) 
U.S. excess supply 
ESUS = EDN = EDT - ESO world market equilibrium (4) 
PDi = Gi(Pu«ei, ZJ i = 1,..., m importer (5) 
PDj = Gj(Pu*ej, Zj) j = 1,..., n exporters (6) 
where 
FOD = domestic food demand 
FED = domestic feed demand 
SD = domestic stock demand 
SU = domestic supply 
EDT = excess demand function of all importers 
ESO = excess supply function of all exporters, excluding the U.S. 
ESUS = excess supply function of the U.S. 
EDN = excess demand facing the U.S. 
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PD = domestic market price 
PS = domestic supply price 
Pu = U.S. Gulf port price (reference price) 
e = exchange rate 
Z = vector of policy variables (tariffs, subsidies) that influence the price 
transmission 
Xfc = vector of demand shifters (k = 1,...3) 
X4 = vector of supply shifters. 
Supply is determined as yield times acreage harvested, which is endogenously 
estimated. One of the salient features of the model is the inclusion of government 
programs in estimating the acreage functions. Particularly in the United States, 
program participation rates are endogenously estimated as a function of expected wheat 
net returns. Area planted under programs is determined from participation rate, base 
acres, and acreage reduction rate. Nonprogram planted acreage is endogenously 
estimated. Total planted area is the sum of program and nonprogram planted area. 
The theoretical specification of food use is based on the consumer theory of utility 
maximization subject to budget constraint. The variables that enter the demand 
functions are own price (wheat price), prices of competing goods, and income. Because 
feed is used as input in livestock production, the theoretical specification of feed 
demand is estimated as a function of own price, prices of competing feed products, and 
livestock product prices. Stock demand is endogenized in the model by using 
speculative and transactions motives of inventory demand theory. Current price, 
expected production, and government stocks are used to capture the speculative motive. 
Current production is used to explain the transaction motive. 
Equilibrium prices, quantities, and net trade are determined by equating excess 
demands and supplies across regions (eq. 4) and explicitly linking domestic market 
prices in each region to the world price (eqs. 5 and 6). Except where they are set by 
governments, domestic prices are linked to the reference price (U.S. Gulf port price) 
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via price linkage equations including bilateral exchange rates and transfer service 
margins. All prices in the model are determined simultaneously. Inclusion of price 
linkage equations in the model allows one to endogenize the stabilizing and insulating 
behavior of government policies. Where some degree of insulation of domestic prices 
from external market conditions exists, the free adjustment of trade flows is restricted 
by limiting the quantity traded at the given level of domestic prices. The price linkage 
equation defines the degree of price transmission of external market conditions into the 
internal system. Trade occurs whether price transmission is allowed or not. The 
quantity traded adjusts only to internal conditions if there is no price transmission. 
The model is estimated over the sample period 1965 - 1986 using annual data. 
The supply, use, and price data for the U.S. component of the model came from various 
issues of USDA Agricultural Statistics. Policy variables such as target prices and loan 
rates were collected from the fact sheets of Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation 
Service (ASCS). Supply and use data for foreign countries come from the Foreign 
Agricultural Service (FAS) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Prices are from the 
Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) of the United Nations, Canadian Grain 
Trade Statistics, and EC Grains. Oilseeds, and Livestock: Selected Statistics. 
Macroeconomic data for all countries are from the International Financial Statistics 
(IFS) of the International Monetary Fund. 
The functional form of the model is linear in parameters. All supply and 
demand equations are estimated in quantity-dependent form in real prices and incomes. 
The estimation procedure used is ordinary least squares. The OLS estimation 
technique is preferred over simultaneous estimation techniques such as two-stage least 
squares and three-stage least squares because, with a large number of exogenous 
variables and a limited number of observations, simultaneous estimation techniques 
pose degrees-of-freedom problems. Furthermore, in many countries, prices are set by 
government policies. Prices are determined by supply and demand in only a few 
countries. As a result, any potential gain that could be achieved by simultaneous 
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estimation is offset by the potential loss if there is any misspecification in the model. 
The presence of serial correlation in the error structure is corrected using the 
Cochrane-Orcutt procedure. 
In general, the statistical fit of the model is good, and the estimated coefficients 
in the behavioral equations conform to the a priori expectations.^ The estimated 
supply, demand, and price transmission elasticities are given in appendix Tables A.1 
and A.2, which represent behavioral relationships in the model. The empirical model 
adequately reflects the structure of the world wheat market. Furthermore, since the 
model is frequently used for forecasting and policy analysis, a rigorous validation test 
was conducted to test the overall ability of the model to replicate the observed values of 
the endogenous variables. In the validation run, the structural form of the model is 
dynamically simulated over the study period. Simulation statistics used to measure the 
model's fitting performance include root mean square error, root mean square percent 
error, and Theil statistics. The simulation statistics indicate that the model performs 
satisfactorily. 
32 Incorporation of the EEP in the World Wheat Trade Model 
The EEP is an export subsidy program targeted to specific importers where 
each importer may receive a different subsidy level. The economics of an optimal 
targeted subsidy program have been outlined by Paarlberg (1984), and by Abbott, 
Paarlberg, and Sharpies (1987). While noting that a general export subsidy program is 
always welfare-reducing for a large country, a targeted subsidy program may lead to 
welfare increases. The exporter price discrimination strategy is to offer lower selling 
prices in markets with relatively price elastic demand, thus, taxing relatively inelastic 
markets, the net result being an export revenue increase. 
The existence of an export subsidy in any market affects the ability of other 
competitive exporters to make sales at the "market clearing price". In highly 
competitive markets, the other exporters will have to fully match the EEP subsidy or 
forego their market share. Thus, other exporters' net prices are directly affected by the 
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EEP subsidies. A unique feature of the EEP is that the export subsidies are paid in 
generic payment-in-kind (PIK) certificates, which are generally redeemed for 
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) stocks, but can also be sold for cash.* The 
issuance of PIK certificates under this program results in an increase in market 
availability of U.S. supplies of wheat. The incorporation of the effect of the PIK 
certificates in the analysis of the EEP was developed by Bailey (1988). This study 
adopts Bailey's approach but treats the response of other exporters differently. 
Thus, three important features of the EEP that must be explicitly modeled are: 
(1) the subsidy offered to each targeted import market 
(2) the net price effect on competitive exporters' excess supply functions and 
(3) the supply effect of PIK certificates issued as wheat EEP payments. 
The effect of the EEP on the world market is illustrated in Figure 2. First, 
consider the effect of targeted subsidy to the importers. The price transmission 
equations of importers, which receive the targeted export subsidies, become: 
where Si = EEP subsidy to importer i. This will result in a movement along the 
importer's excess demand curve by the amount of the subsidy. At every price level, the 
importer's 'effective excess demand curve' will lie above their excess demand curve by 
the amount of the subsidy. In Figure 2 this is represented by an upward shift in a 
targeted importers' excess demand curves by the amount of the subsidy S^. 
Second, consider the effect of the EEP on competitors' wheat markets. This 
effect is modeled through the price linkage equation as: 
where Sj is the average subsidy or price reduction offered by the jth exporter on export 
sales to be competitive with EEP.' This is the additional price reduction (or subsidy) 
required by competing exporters and would not include normal quality or trade 
PDi — Gi[(Pu - Sij»ei, Zi]  (7) 
PDj - Gj[(Pu - Sj)*ej, Zj] (8) 
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Figure 2. The Impact of the EEP on World Wheat Trade 
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differentials which would exist in the competitive exporters' pre-EEP premium or 
discount to U.S. wheat prices. This will result in a movement along the exporter's 
excess supply curve by the amount of the subsidy or price reduction. At every price 
level, the exporter's 'effective excess supply curve' will lie above their excess supply 
curve by the amount of the effective subsidy. In Figure 2, the impact on the EEC is 
merely an increase in the amount of export restitutions, while the impact of this average 
price reduction on other exporters is represented by an upward shift in the competitors' 
total export supply curve of other exporters from ES2 to ES2'.® Thus, the excess supply 
curve of all other exporters shifts from ESQ to ESQ'. The specific conjectural variation 
in this analysis is that competitive exporters respond to U.S. EEP subsidies with their 
own matching subsidies or price reductions.' Previous studies have used the conjectural 
variation of no response by other exporters (Abbott, Paarlberg, and Sharpies, 1987) or 
price response by only selected other exporters (Haley, 1988; Bailey, 1988 and 1989). 
The approach of competitive price response by all other exporters will capture the 
world wheat market more accurately as evidenced by the competitors' actual price 
responses to the EEP. 
Finally, consider the supply effect of the generic PIK certificates issued through 
the wheat EEP. Use of the generic PIK certificates to redeem the CCC-owned wheat 
stocks will increase market supply of U.S. wheat. However, generic PIK certificates 
issued on EEP wheat sales can be used to redeem gny available commodity in the CCC-
owned stocks. As a result, only a portion of the certificates are used to redeem wheat 
stocks. For example, according to the USD A, in the 1987/88 crop year only 21 percent 
of total PIK certificates were used for wheat redemption. This extra wheat supply 
results in a rightward shift of the U.S supply curve from SUS to SUS in Figure 2 and 
the U.S. excess supply curve from ESUS to ESUS . This supply effect is captured by 
the equation: 
m 
AQu = [(2 Si-EDi.). (5]/P, ; 0 ^ (5 ^ 1 (9) 
1=0 
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where AQ^ = change in market availability of U.S. wheat supplies 
EDje = net imports of wheat by ith importer using EEP 
Si = subsidy on wheat imports by ith importer 
P, = PIK certificate redemption price for wheat in U.S. $ per bushel 
Ô = proportion of PIK certificates used to redeem CCC wheat stocks. 
Thus, the total wheat EEP-issued PIK certificates used to redeem wheat stocks 
m 
[(2 Si'EDie) • d] divided by the average redemption price defines the increase in U.S. 
i=0 
marketable wheat stocks. 
Thus, the EEP results in an upward shift in the net export demand facing the 
U.S., which is caused by the increased import demand by the importers and reduced 
export supply of the competitors. This, combined with an outward shift in the U.S. 
excess supply schedule, will result in an unambiguous increase in U.S. wheat exports. 
The effect of the EEP on the U.S. Gulf port price (reference price) is ambiguous 
because of the offsetting excess demand-supply effects. In Figure 2, these offsetting 
excess supply and demand effects are shown as resulting in no change in the U.S. 
market clearing price, but either a price increase or decrease could alternatively have 
been illustrated. The overall impact of the wheat EEP depends on the size of EEP 
subsidies, the price responsiveness of import demand, the price transmission elasticities 
of both import and export markets, the effective average subsidies offered by other 
exporters, the elasticity of supply of export competitors, and redemptions of U.S. CCC 
wheat stocks due to EEP-issued PIK certificates. 
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4. EMPIRICAL INCORPORATION OF THE EEP INTO 
THE WORLD WHEAT TRADE MODEL 
The major empirical incorporations of the EEP into the world wheat trade 
model are the determination of (a) the appropriate average import subsidy Si received 
by each targeted importer, (b) the appropriate average export subsidy or price 
reduction Sj offered by each competitive exporter, and (c) additional U.S. wheat supply 
resulting from wheat EEP-issued PIK certificates. This section describes the empirical 
issues related to these three categories. 
4.1 Subsidies to Importers 
From the data collected on EEP sales announcements by the USD A, estimates 
were obtained for the subsidy on each sale and total EEP shipments by crop year to 
each targeted importer. The average EEP subsidy offered by the U.S. to a targeted 
importer in a crop year is computed as total subsidy divided by total shipments to that 
importer. The average export subsidies received by the importing countries are given in 
Table 1. 
The average export subsidies (bonuses) paid by the U.S. were then assumed to 
be matched by all other exporters for their commercial sales (non-aid sales) into the 
specific market. For example, the USSR received an average export subsidy of 
$35.40/MT in 1987/88 for the U.S. EEP wheat exports, and it is assumed that other 
exporting countries also offered an EEP competitive price to the USSR in 1987/88. 
Thus, the importer is assumed to receive the average subsidy on its entire commercial 
imports, excluding aid shipments. This is an extreme assumption in that the specific 
importer-exporter relationship with regard to long-term agreements, credit availability, 
and wheat quality consideration will affect the degree to which any exporter must 
compete with the effective U.S. price in the market. Also, subsidies are limited in most 
markets to the total EEP sales that will be completed, and this moderates the need of 
other exporters to be EEP competitive. This assumption will thus overestimate the 
impact of the EEP on U.S. wheat exports and total world trade in this non-spatial 
model.® This assumption was also used by Bailey (1988) in examining the impact of the 
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Table 1. Subsidies Received by the Importers for U.S. Wheat EEP Shipmentsa 
Country 1986/87 1987/88 1988/89^ 
USSR 
EEP Shipments (lOOOMT) 
EEP as Percent of Total Imports 
Average Bonus (US $/MT)® 
EEP Shipments (lOOOMT) 
EEP as Percent of Total Imports 
Average Bonus (US $/MT) 
EEP Shipments (lOOOMT) , 
EEP as Percent of Total Imports" 
Average Bonus (US $/MT) 
Alggri^EEP Shipments (lOOOMT) 
EEP as Percent of Total Imports 






EP Shipments (lOOOMT) 
EEP as Percent of Total Imports 
Average Bonus (US $/MT) 
EEP Shipments (lOOOMT) 
EEP as Percent of Total Imports 
Average Bonus (US $/&^ 
EEP Shipments (lOOOMT) 
EEP as Percent of Total Imports 
Average Bonus (US $/MT) 
" ^EEP Shipments (lOOOMT) 
EEP as Percent of Total Imports 
Average Bonus (US $/MT) 
Philippm^l^ Shipments (lOOOMT) 
EEP as Percent of Total Imports 
Poland 
Average Bonus (US $/MT) 
1 
EEP Shipments (lOOOMT) 
EEP as Percent of Total Imports 









































































475 1,500 " 
41.3Ï 39.74 
^Calculated on a June-May shipment basis. 
DTo June 1989. 
Estimated by contract announcement data and trade information. 
"This total import figure includes aid shipments. 
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EEP. 
The incorporation of the EEP into importer submodels does not capture the 
impact of downward price pressure in markets not targeted for EEP sales, even though 
exporters displaced in EEP markets may price more competitvely in the remaining non-
EEP markets. 
42 Competitors' Export Subsidies or Price Reductions 
The export subsidies or average price reductions offered by U.S. export 
competitors were calculated by assuming the exporters generally responded to be 
competitive with the U.S. EEP subsidy. The average export subsidy or price reduction 
is equal to the country's proportion of total commercial sales to targeted EEP markets 
weighted by the respective average EEP subsidies to each market®. The results of this 
calculation are given in Table 2. For example, the Canadian average export revenue 
due to the EEP, is estimated to be US $18/MT in 1987/88. This is because 
approximately 32 percent^" of Canadian exports going to China, which received an 
average EEP subsidy of US $39.85/MT and 18 percent of exports going to the USSR 
which received an average EEP subsidy of US $35.40/MT. Other significant Canadian 
wheat export markets targeted by the EEP in 1987/88 were Algeria (3%), Brazil (3%) 
and Iraq (3%). Record Canadian wheat exports of 23.5 MMT in 1987/88 indicate that 
Canada was price competitive in 1987/88 and, in fact, Canadian ending stocks of wheat 
relative to 1986/87 were reduced by approximately 5.0 MMT. 
The 1988/89 calculated average net price reduction for Canada of $7.00/MT is 
a reflection of significantly drought-reduced production in 1988. Estimates of Canadian 
exports of only 11.8 MMT for 1988/89 (50 percent of the 1987/88 level), and a very 
high average quality harvest, indicate that Canada need not have had to compete 
directly with EEP price levels. This was directly reflected in increases in the 1988/89 
Canadian initial price to producers from C$120/MT (prior to harvest) to C$170/MT. 
The incorporation of the EEP into exporter submodels does not account for 
downward price pressure in markets not targeted for EEP sales, even though exporters 
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Table 2. Average Export Subsidies or Price Reductions Offered by Exporters^ 
Exporters 1986/87 1987/88 1988/89 
US$/MT 
Canada 6.00 18.00 7.00 
Australia 12.00 15.00 7.00 
EEC 8.00 15.00 13.00 
Argentina 7.50 16.00 9.00 
^These are estimated average export revenue declines due to the U.S. Export 
Enhancement Program. For instance, the $7.50/MMT effective bonus offered by 
Argentina for its \^eat exports in 198^87 is the additional average discount for 
Argentine wheat below U.S. FOB Gulf port price due to EEP competition. 
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displaced in EEP markets may have priced more competitively in the remaining non-
EE? markets. It is assumed that if the U.S. is making sales into a nontargeted market it 
does so at a U.S. Gulf port price and this establishes the competitive price for other 
exporters in the nontargeted market. 
A3 Incorporation of Wheat EEP Issued PIK Certificates 
The EEP subsidy payment to U.S. exporters in generic certificates increases the 
market access to CCC-held commodity stocks. The generic certificates are fungible in 
the sense that they can be redeemed for any available CCC-held stocks or traded fi-eely 
for cash. In this sense, it does not seem unreasonable to assume that wheat EEP-
issued PIK certificates would enter into the pool of generic certificates issued under 
other government programs and be redeemed for commodities at the historical rate. 
The 1986-88 generic certificates supply and use are outlined in Table 3. In 1986/87, 
only $205 million of a total $8.1 billion certificates were issued through the EEP for 
wheat. PIK certificate redemptions for wheat in 1986/87 represented only 18.2 percent 
of the total. The certificates are assumed to be redeemed at the crop-year average rate, 
taking into account any PIK certificate premiums over face value. 
The pattern of wheat certificate exchange has a direct impact on the U.S. wheat 
submodel and must be carefully analyzed. Table 4 shows the pattern of PIK certificate 
redemptions for 1986/87 and 1987/88. The CCC wheat auction was a dominant market 
force in 1987/88, accounting for 46 percent of wheat redemptions. This changed the 
pattern of wheat redemptions between 9-month loans, Farmer-Owned-Reserve (FOR) 
stock, and CCC stock from 1986/87 to 1987/88 as the CCC wheat auction released only 
CCC stocks. 
The impact of wheat EEP-issued PIK certificates on U.S. marketable stocks of 
wheat is calculated by using equation 9. The total wheat EEP-issued PIK certificates 
are estimated using EEP contract announcement data and market information on 
subsidy level per sale. The proportion of these generic PIK certificates that are actually 
redeemed for wheat stocks is assumed to be the historical rate for total PIK 
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Table 3. Generic Certificate Supply and Use& 
1986/87 1987/88 
-- Million US $-
Carry-in 0 2,050 
Certificates Issued 8,138 11,937 
Wheat EEP Issued 205 1,026 
Certificate Redemptions 6,088 10,020 
Wheat 1,106 2,124 
Wheat as Percent of Total Redemptions 18.2 21.2 
^Bailey and Houck, 1989. 
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Table 4. U.S. Generic certificate exchange for wheat^ 
1986/87 1987/88 
Wheat Certificate Exchange (mil. $) 1,106 2,124 
Wheat Redemptions (mil. bu) 457 834 
9-month loans 221 190 
FOR loans 84 64 
CCC Stocks 152 580 
CCC Wheat Auction Activity (mil. bu)^ 0 385.2 
^Bailey and Houck, 1989. 
^ Stocks released through CCC wheat auctions (USDA, 1989). 
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redemptions; i.e., 18.2 percent in 1986/87,21.2 percent in 1987/88, and 8 percent in 
1988/89. The average redemption price for wheat was estimated by using the crop year 
average wheat price (on-farm) times the average cash premium of PIK certificates to 
their face value. 
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5. RESULTS 
The major aspects of the EEP were incorporated into the model, and a 
baseline simulation was developed for years 1985/86 to 1988/89. The impact of the 
wheat EEP for crop years 1986/87 to 1988/89 was then determined by running the 
alternate (no-EEP) scenario in which (a) the EEP effects on importers and exporters 
were removed (i.e., all Si and Sj were set to zero) and (b) U.S. market supply 
reductions resulting from fewer PIK certificates were incorporated. The analytical 
results from the baseUne and no-EEP scenario are summarized in Tables 5-7. The 
impact of the EEP, measured as the difference between the two scenarios, is given in 
Table 8. 
The results indicate that U.S. wheat exports increased by 31 million bushels in 
1986/87 because of the wheat EEP (Table 5), while actual EEP shipments were 
estimated to be 245 million bushels. Thus, the additionality (i.e., increase in U.S. 
exports above what would have occurred in the absence of the program) was 13 percent 
(31 million bushels) and commercial displacement was 87 percent (214 million bushels). 
The estimated cost of the EEP shipment subsidies for 1986/87 was $224 million 
(estimated by EEP contract announcement data and trade reported prices). This figure 
is the gross subsidy outlay and does not account for changes in carrying costs due to 
reduced wheat stocks or changes in CCC program costs due to changes in the U.S. farm 
price for wheat. Although the size of the EEP varied over the three-year period, the 
estimated percentage of additionality remained relatively constant at 8 -13 percent. In 
1987/88 with 1,016 million bushels of EEP shipments, only 83 million bushels were 
estimated as additionality. 
The EEP has had a noticeable impact on U.S. ending stocks, export levels and 
export market shares, U.S. farm price, and the U.S. Gulf Port Price for wheat. In all 
years, 1986/87 to 1988/89, the price impact of the EEP-induced increased demand for 
U.S. exports has outweighed the U.S. domestic supply effect (due to increased PIK 
certificates), resulting in a higher U.S. wheat price. This supports the view that the EEP 
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Table 5. U.S. Wheat Supply and Use under Baseline and No-EEP Scenario 
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Table 6. Competitors' Wheat Supply and Exports 
Countries Scenarios 1986/87 1987/88 1988/89 
Canada 
Area Harvested Base 14.22 13:53 12.91 
(mÛlion Ha) No-EEP 14.22 13.61 13.17 
Production Base 31.34 26.01 15.70 
(MMT) No-EEP 31.34 26.16 16.01 
Exports Base 20.98 23.54 11.80 
(N#r) No-EEP 21.11 23.93 12.04 
Australia 
Area Harvested Base 11.10 9.10 9.00 (million Ha) No-EEP 11.10 9.20 9.17 
Production Base 16.10 12.41 13.80 (MMT) No-EEP 16.10 12.54 14.06 
Eroorts 
(WMT) 
Base 15.60 9.60 11.50 
No-EEP 15.60 9.98 11.68 
EEC-12 
Area Harvested Base 15.70 15.90 15.40 (million Ha) No-EEP 15.70 15.90 15.40 
Production Base 71.97 71.60 75.70 (MMT) No-EEP 71.97 71.60 75.70 
Exports Base 14.48 14.29 19.00 (N#r) No-EEP 14.48 14.29 19.00 
Argentina 
Area Harvested Base 5.00 4,80 4.50 (million Ha) No-EEP 5.00 4.85 4.61 
Production Base 8.90 9.00 7.40 (MMT) No-EEP 8.90 9.10 7.57 
Exports Base 4.40 3.70 3.20 (ND4T) No-EEP 4.42 3.81 3.38 
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Table 7. Wheat Net Imports 
Countries Scenarios 1986/87 1987/88 1988/89 
MMT-—• 
USSR Base 15.50 21.00 12.00 
No-EEP 15.54 20.38 11.55 
China Base 8.51 15.00 15.01 
No-EEP 8.51 15.00 15.01 
Japan Base 5.80 5.70 5.40 
No-EEP 5.80 5.70 5.40 
Eastern Europe Base 1.99 1.41 -1.50 
No-EEP 1.99 1.41 -1.50 
Egypt Base 6.02 6.43 6.40 
No-EEP 6.02 6.43 6.40 
Algeria Base 3.41 3,80 3.70 
No-EEP 3.31 3.70 3.62 
India Base -0.32 -0.45 2.45 
No-EEP -0.32 -0.75 1.87 
Brazil Base 2.70 2.05 2.44 
No-EEP 2.70 2.03 2.43 
Mexico Base 0.46 0.75 1.20 
No-EEP 0.46 0.75 1.20 
Tunisia Base 1.13 0.85 1.10 
No-EEP 1.11 0.82 1.08 
Morocco Base 1.50 1.90 1.52 
No-EEP 1.38 1.72 1.38 
Other Africa and Base 14.44 13.45 12.96 
Middle East No-EEP 14.44 13.44 12.86 
Other Latin Base 5.53 5.43 5.65 
America No-EEP 5.54 5.49 5.72 
Other Asia Base 8.23 9.17 9.65 
No-EEP 7.68 8.64 9.21 
Total Net Trade Base 82.22 94.29 85.74 
No-EEP 81.51 92.60 84.08 
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Table 8. Impact of the Wheat Export Enhancement Program on U.S. Wheat Exports 
1986/87 1987/88 1988/89» 
.......... 
—million bushels-








Change due to EEP 31 83 84 
Actual EEP Shipments^ 245 1,016 839 








Estimated EEP Subsidies^ 224 997 474 
(million US $) 
PEEP shipments as of June, 1989. 
"Estimated using shipment data by contract announcement. 
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tended to exaggerate the impact of the 1988 drought-reduced wheat supply in the U.S. 
The U.S. Gulf wheat price increased by US$ 6.76 per MT in 1987/88 and US$ 2.39 per 
MT in 1988/89 due to the EEP. 
The response of other exporters to the EEP is summarized in Table 6. The 
results indicate only a minor negative impact of the EEP on exports from Canada, 
Australia, and Argentina. Wheat production levels in these countries also showed a 
minor negative impact of the EEP.^^ The European Community, with a price 
transmission elasticity of zero due to its variable import levy system of price supports, 
does not respond to the EEP in terms of total export volume. The EEC export of wheat 
was moderately displaced in certain Middle East markets, but increased exports to the 
USSR and other countries have resulted in no significant reductions in EEC total 
exports. The analysis assumes domestic wheat programs of other exporters and 
importers as exogenous, and thus, any impact that the EEP may have had on EEC 
policy changes over this period is not captured in the analysis. 
The impacts of the EEP on major wheat importers are given in Table 7. The 
impact of the EEP on importers depends upon the domestic price transmission 
elasticity with respect to the import price facing the country. For the People's of 
Republic China, the model assumes that the domestic price and domestic use are 
exogenous to the import price and, thus, that the EEP has no impact on China's wheat 
imports. Given a reported increase in total domestic wheat use in China over the 
period, the results for China may underestimate the impact of the wheat EEP.^^ 
Egypt, one of the largest EEP recipients also exhibits no net import response to 
the EEP. This is a reasonable result given that actual Egyptian wheat imports have 
remained fairly constant since the introduction of the EEP. The composition of 
Egyptian imports by countiy of origin, however, has changed in favor of the U.S. since 
the introduction of the EEP. 
The USSR total net import response to the EEP is also moderate because 
domestic demand and supply are only partially responsive to import prices. Again, the 
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composition of USSR net imports may have been altered significantly by the EEP, but 
these net trade flows are not captured by the nonspatial equilibrium model. 
The overall net wheat trade increased 0.7 MMT in 1986/87,1.7 MMT in 
1987/88, and 1.7 MMT in 1988/89 due to the wheat EEP. 
5.1 Limitations and Conclusions 
The result must be viewed in the context of the limitations of an annual non-
spatial equilibrium model. The model assumes that wheat is a single homogenous 
commodity by each exporter. As such, the model does not capture the effect of quality 
differences between exporters and does not analyze the differential impacts across 
classes of wheat within the U.S. The impact of the EEP on U.S. durum wheat is 
different from that for the U.S. white wheat market. Because the model is a partial 
equilibrium model, the cross commodity effects, which may be significant, are not 
incorporated in determining the net impact of the wheat EEP. 
Because of the model's annual nature, it does not account for different seasons 
of production and shipping between northern and southern hemispheres. Thus, the 
model does not capture the differential impact of EEP in markets due to timing of sales 
within a crop year. The EEP sales to Brazil were conducted during periods when 
Argentine sales revenue activity into this market was low; thus, the impact on Argentine 
sales may have been moderated. The EEP sales to the USSR, however, were 
conducted continuously and may have had a more depressing effect on Argentine sales 
returns from this market. The incorporation of the EEP into the world wheat trade 
model also does not capture the impact of downward price pressure in markets not 
targeted for EEP sales, even though exporters displaced in EEP markets may price 
more competitively for these remaining non-EEP markets. 
The modeling of the EEP also assumes that other nonprice domestic and trade 
policies of other importers and exporters are exogenous in response to the EEP. The 
Canadian Special Grains Program, however, was specifically enacted to offset the price-
depressing effect of the EEP; thus, the modeling approach will overestimate the supply 
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response and export reduction by Canada. The EEC-12 wheat acreage set-aside 
program may also be a result of the depressing effect of the EEP on export revenues. 
The modeling assumption that targeted importers receive EEP-competitive 
prices on all commercial imports is an extreme one, which results in an overestimate of 
the impact of the EEP on world trade and an underestimate of the impact on other 
exporters' net export levels. The modeling approach does not allow for analysis of the 
impacts of the EEP on trade flows between countries. The main impact of the EEP 
would seem to be on trade flows and not on changes in net export and net import 
volumes by each countiy. However, given the EEP objective of additionality, the 
modeling approach does capture the overall net impact of the EEP on world trade 
volumes, market shares, and U.S. net exports. 
In summary, the analysis using the annual world wheat trade model indicates 
that the wheat EEP has expanded U.S. exports and caused a decline in Canadian, 
Australian, and Argentine wheat exports. The export additionality of the program is 
estimated at 8-13 percent over the period 1986/87 to 1988/89 (Table 8). These results 
are generally lower than to those determined in other studies. Hillberg (1988), using a 
quarterly, spatial equilibrium model of world wheat trade, reported EEP additionality 
ranging from 10 percent (October 1985-March 1986) to 17-20 percent (April/June 
1987). Bailey (1988) reported export additionality at a high of 58 percent for 1986/87 
to 14 percent for 1987/88. The incorporation of a nonpassive price response by all 
other exporters in response to EEP subsidies is the major determinant that would 
explain the lower estimates of export additionality. In particular, while Bailey (1988) 
calculated large export additionality for 1986/87, the current study was unable to 
confirm high export additionality for the EEP in any year. 
The analysis suggests that the ability of the EEP to expand U.S. exports (rather 
than to change the market composition of U.S. exports) is limited by retaliatory price 
responses of competing exporters. The effectiveness of the EEP to increase U.S. wheat 
exports has been moderated by the domestic policies of most major wheat importers 
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and exporters, which decrease the domestic price transmission elasticities with respect 
to import prices. U.S. export expansion since 1985/86 is attributable mainly to U.S. 
loan rate reductions, production conditions and domestic policies of major importing 
(USSR, China) and exporting (Canada) countries. Examination of the EEP with 
respect to its initial stated objectives suggests that the goals of additionality and cost 
effectiveness are not being met. 
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7. FOOTNOTES 
1. The data for these figures come from U.S. Department of Agriculture,Foreign 
Agricultural Service, "Export Markets for U.S. Grain and Products", Various issues. 
2. Haley (1988) includes a scenario with the assumption of competitive price response by 
the European Community only. 
3. Space limitations do not allow reporting the complete details of the wheat trade model. 
Readers interested in the modeling approach, structural coefficients, estimated equations, 
and model validation may refer to Devadoss, Helmar, and Meyers (1990). 
4. Generic PIK certificates are presented to export merchants who have successfully 
completed a sale. 
5. For the EEC, Sj represents an increase in the export rebate for wheat which is an 
explicit export subsidy. For Canada, Australia, and Argentina, Sj will represent an 
average price reduction necessary to compete with the EEP in targeted markets. 
6. Equations (7) and (8) do not result in shifts in the domestic supply and demand curves. 
The effective subsidies create movements along the respective supply and demand 
schedules. 
7. Where information was available on the relative price response of competitive exporters 
to the EEP in specific countries, this information was used in place of the full response 
conjecture. 
8. The degree of overestimation cannot be evaluated because of the limitations of 
incorporating the EEP program details in the world wheat model. 
9. The average price reductions were calculated on the actual export pattern of each 
exporter for the year being analyzed. 
10. Estimated using International Wheat Council Statistics. 
11. Roberts and Love (1989) calculate that Australian wheat production was reduced by 
between 0.7 and 1.0 MMT in 1987/88 due to the EEP. The Roberts and Love calculation 
used a point supply elasticity (0.39) borrowed from a model of Australian agriculture only, 
while the current study estimates an Australian wheat supply elasticity of 0.18 (evaluated 
at the mean) using a world wheat trade model. As well, the Roberts and Love elasticity 
is with respect to nominal wheat price, while our elasticity is with respect to the real wheat 
price (nominal price deflated by tiie GNP deflator). Our estimated reduction in Australian 
wheat production (0.13 MMT) in 1987/88 is lower than that of Roberts and Love. 
12. USDA reports a 4.0 MMT increase in China's domestic use to 105.5 MMT in 1987/88. 
These figures are subject to a high degree of error, however, because of uncertainty 
regarding actual PRC wheat production. 
45 
SECTION H: 
EXPORT ALLOCATION AND PRICE DISCRIMINATION POLICIES 
UNDER DEMAND UNCERTAINTY 
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This paper investigates price discrimination policies for a large country 
disposing of a fixed quantity of output to a certain and an uncertain market. In addition 
to price elasticities of demand, risk is an important reason for price discrimination. A 
risk neutral government sets a higher price in the uncertain market than under 
certainty, but the effect of increased risk aversion is ambiguous. When exports are 
allocated ex ante, the risk neutral exporter allocates more output in the riskless market 
than under certainty. The ranking of price and quantity setting policies for foreign 
disposal of surplus output is generally ambiguous. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
It is well known that a large country can improve welfare through an optimal 
tariff on imports or an equivalent export tax and that an export subsidy is welfare 
reducing. Despite this theoretical result, export subsidies are widely used in many 
developed countries. Recently, Abbott, Paarlberg and Sharpies (1987) demonstrated 
that targeted export subsidies can increase welfare of an exporting country by exploiting 
differences in price elasticities of import demands. Specifically, they suggested that 
export subsidies be targeted to markets with more elastic import demands.^ Similarly, 
Button (1990) provided a rationale for widespread use of export subsidies. He showed 
that when taxes to some countries are constrained to suboptimal levels, export subsidies 
to other importers can improve welfare of the exporter. 
Although domestic supply and demand are realized at the end of the 
production period, import demands in some foreign markets may be subject to random 
shifts.^ Uncertainty in foreign import demands are an important cause of export 
earnings instability in both developed and developing countries. Keynes (1942) 
regarded the wide and rapid fluctuations in the world prices of primary products as one 
of the greatest "evils" in trade and campaigned for international cooperation for 
regulating primary commodity prices.^ In the absence of international cooperation, a 
large country may exercise market power to set export prices. For example, Button 
(1990) argued that targeted export subsidies may be used as an exercise of market 
power.* 
Since the literature focused on how different price elasticities of foreign import 
demands affect export subsidies, the effects of risks in foreign markets on export pricing 
policies have yet to be investigated. In a seminal paper. Young and Anderson (1982) 
investigated optimal tariff and quantity setting policies for an importable good. They 
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showed that the ranking of ex ante policies depends crucially on how closely the 
domestic price of the traded good under alternative policies approximates the optimal 
state-contingent price. 
This paper investigates optimal export allocation and price discrimination 
policies of a government that disposes of a fixed quantity of surplus output in two 
foreign markets with random import demands/ While the literature emphasized 
different price elasticities of foreign import demands, we show that risk is an important 
reason for price discrimination for foreign disposal of surplus outputs even when the 
exporter is risk neutral. This paper extends the literature on optimal trade policies in 
two important respects. First, we extend the multicountiy model of Abbott, Paarlberg 
and Sharpies (1987) and Button (1990) and investigate how risk affects optimal price 
and quantity setting policies for foreign disposal of surplus outputs. Second, while 
conventional theories focused on optimal trade restricting policies, we employ Young 
and Anderson's (1982) framework and investigate the ranking of export promoting 
policies. 
Section 2 examines optimal ex ante price setting policy in the market with 
uncertain import demand. Section 3 investigates ex ante export allocation policy 
between certain and uncertain foreign markets. Section 4 considers the ranking of 
these export promotion policies for a country facing stochastic import demands. 
Concluding remarks are contained in Section 5. 
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2. EX ANTE PRICE SETTING POLICY 
Many governments intervene in commodity markets either by distorting 
production through price supports and input price subsidies, or by distorting 
consumption through price and stock policies. These government programs generally 
result in a surplus of goods, which are then exported to foreign markets. For instance, 
in the European Community producer and consumer prices of agricultural products are 
generally set within a crop year and determined by political considerations. These 
prices can vary in response to changes in political conditions, but are insensitive to 
changes in world market conditions within a production period. Consequently, the 
export of surplus commodities for any year is the residual of domestic policy variables, 
and is known before the foreign import demands are realized. 
The exports are often subsidized and sold with little regard to covering the 
costs of production or domestic producer prices ensured by government policy (e.g., 
European Community Agricultural Commodity export programs). The export subsidies 
have become an important issue in the current Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations. 
While domestic supply and demand are generally uncertain when production decisions 
are made, domestic market disturbances are usually resolved well before foreign 
demands are known. This is a likely occurrence for agricultural commodities where 
forecasts of foreign production and import demands for major importers (e.g., USSR, 
China) are subject to a large variance. 
Consider an open economy that regulates producer and consumer prices via 
commodity programs. At the beginning of the period the government announces the 
domestic price of an exportable. The domestic price p is assumed to be determined by 
political considerations. Given domestic price p, domestic production Y(p) and 
consumption decisions X(p) are realized, and hence the surplus output for foreign 
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disposal, Q(p) = Y(p) - X(p), is known at the end of the production period (Gallagher, 
1990).® However, the government is assumed to face uncertain foreign demands at the 
end of the period. 
For simplicity, assume that the government exports surplus output Q to two 
markets, and that demand in market 1 is certain while that in market 2 is subject to 
random shifts. If the country is large, the government can exercise export price 
discrimination between foreign markets when resale of output between the two markets 
is infeasible. The optimal policy of disposing of a fixed commodity surplus has been 
investigated under demand certainty (Gallagher, 1990). Fishelson and Flatters (1975) 
pointed out that equivalence between policy instruments breaks down under 
uncertainty. Their work suggests that in the presence of foreign demand uncertainty the 
exporting country can use either price price setting or quantity setting policies to 
dispose of surplus commodities in the foreign markets. 
In this section we investigate the effect of demand uncertainty on optimal ex 
ante price setting policy. To lay the basis for analyzing export allocation and pricing 
policy under uncertainty we begin by describing import demand and inverse import 
functions in the two markets. Let q^ = h(pi) denote the import demand function in the 
certain market. The inverse import demand function is written as Pi = h'^(qi) = k(qi). 
The random demand in market 2 is generally expressed as qg = {^(Pz.a). Empirical 
analyses indicate that export demands are subject to multiplicative shifts, rather than 
additive shifts. We consider a multiplicative shift in the import demand function, i.e., qg 
= af(p2), where a is a positive random variable with Ea = 1. Thus, an increase in a 
represents an increase in import demand, bo^/ba > 0/ The inverse demand function 
can be solved explicitly. Since f(p2) = qz/a, the inverse import demand in the risky 
market is written aspg = f^qz/a) = g(q2/«)- Note also that for given quantity an 
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increase in a increases price, = - g'a"^ > 0. With this specification of 
multiplicative random demand, variability of quantity demanded increases as price 
declines.® 
Since the total output for export Q is known, the govenunent is assumed to 
maximize expected utility of total export revenue,® Consider first the policy of setting 
Pi in the riskless market before demand uncertainty in market 2 is resolved. There are 
two important consequences of price setting in the certain market. First, this price 
setting policy insulates the certain market from disturbances originating in the risky 
market. That is, demand uncertainty in market 2 causes only price uncertainty in that 
market, and does not spill over to the certain market. Second, because the quantity 
sold in market 1, q^, is known with certainty, ex ante price setting and quantity setting in 
the certain market are equivalent. The quantity setting policy will be examined in 
Section 3. 
We now focus on the ex ante price setting policy in the risky market. The price 
setting policy in the risky market is enforceable only if the government supplies the 
random quantity demanded at the announced price. Consequently, the certain market 
becomes a residual market for export. Since the total output for export Q is given, price 
setting policy in the risky market creates revenue uncertainty in the market with certain 
demand. Although there is no demand uncertainty in market 1, price setting policy in 
market 2 causes uncertainty in price and quantity supplied in market 1. 
Recall that domestic price p is known before foreign demand is realized. Price 
setting implies a fixed export subsidy or tax Sg = p - pg to the risky market and a random 
export subsidy or tax s^ = p - p^ to the market with certain demand." Goverimients 
often announce export subsidies targeted to importers before foreign import demands 
are realized. 
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The import demand function for market 2 is explicitly written as qz = af(p2). 
The government's problem is to maximize the expected utility of profit 
BUM = EU[qiPi + qzPzl = EU[pi(Q -af(p2)) + p2«f(p2)], (1) 
subject to Q = Qi + Qz, or qi = Q - afEpz]. Let = piq^ and 0^ = dR^/dq^ be export 
revenue and marginal revenue from market i, respectively. Note that Rg = af(p2)p2 = 
q2g(q2/a). The first order condition is 
EUp^ = E{U' .(dqg/dpgX- 0, + 02» = 0, (2) 
since dq^/dpg = (dqi/dq2)(dq2/dp2) = - (dq2/dp2). Note that (dq2/dp2) = af'CPz) k a 
random variable. 
2.1. Risk Neutrality 
Consider first the case where the government is risk neutral. Evaluating (2) for 
a risk neutral government (U" = 0), we have 
f'E[a(-0i + 02)] = O. (3) 
Differentiating p2 = g(q2/a) = g[f(p2)] with respect to p2 gives 1 = g'f, or g' = 
l/f'(P2). Note that random demand schedule q2 = af(p2) induces a random marginal 
revenue schedule 02(q2). However, for given price pg, marginal revenue 0% is 
evaluated at random output = af(p2). Specifically, when the marginal revenue 
schedule, 0% = g + q^'/a = g + f(P2)g' =Pz + f(Pz)/^'(Pz), is evaluated at a 
nonrandom price pg, it is not random as it depends only on the given price level pg. Let 
P5 and Pg denote the optimal price of a risk neutral government under uncertainty and 
that under demand certainty, respectively. Thus, the first order condition for pg is 
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rewritten 
Ecf(-E0i + @2) + Cov(o!,-0i) = 0. (3') 
Note that a change in a does not directly affect ©i = qi(dpi/dqi) + Pi(qi), but 
indirectly through a change in q^. The second order condition for a revenue maximum 
requires a negatively sloped marginal revenue schedule in market i (dGi/dq^ < 0). 
This implies that d0i/da = (d0i/dqi)(dqi/da) = -(d0i/dqi)f(p2) > 0. Thus, Cov(a,-
@1) < 0, and 
If the marginal revenue schedule 0i is linear in output (d^0i/dqi^ = 0), then d^0i/da^ 
= (d^0i/dqi^)f® = 0. Then E0i(a) = 0i(Ea). Note that Eqi(a,p2) = E[Q - af(p2)] = 
Q - f(p2) = qi(Ea,p2). Thus, when evaluated at 
Recall that 02(p2) is increasing in p2 while ©^(pg) is decreasing in pg, and 0i(pD = 
®2(pD' Thus, (4') is satisfied at some price p5 > p|. This implies that the risk neutral 
government sets a higher price pS > Pa and on the average markets less output to the 
risky market than if the mean demand in the risky market is observed with certainty, 
EqzCp^ < <É(PD-
PROPOSITION 1: Assume that a government allocates a fixed output Q between 
market 1 with certain demand and market 2 with uncertain demand and sets price in 
market 2 before observing its random demand. If import demand schedules are linear, 
then a risk neutral government sets a higher price in the risky market and allocates less 
©2 > E01, (4) 
©2 > ©i(Ea). (4') 
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output on the average than if the mean demand in that market is observed with 
certainty, p? > p» and Eqg < 
Figure 1 depicts linear marginal revenue schedules, ©i and ©2, for markets 1 
and 2, respectively. If demand curves are linear, the corresponding marginal revenues 
are also linear. From the random revenue function Rg = paQz, marginal revenue 
schedule in market 2 is given by @2 = g(q2/«) + q2gV«- When evaluated at a given 
output, ©2 = giqz/a) + ta is random. For simplicity, consider a binary gamble of 
two states, z and -z, with equal probabilities. Then the random variable a reduces to a 
= 1 ± z. For a linear demand curve qg = a(a - p^), the inverse demand function is pg = 
(a - qa/a), and the marginal revenue is ©% = a - The marginal revenue schedule 
in state z is ©2+ = a-2q2/(l + z), and that in state - z is ©2- = a - 2q2/(l - z). The 
certain demand in market 1 is q^ = a - p^. Certain marginal revenue schedule in 
market 1 is ©^ = a - 2qi, and marginal revenue in market 2 under certainty is ©2c = a -
2q2* 
In the absence of uncertainty, the optimal export allocation q^ and q| occurs at 
point C, the intersection of ©1 and ©2c. The optimal prices under certainty are derived 
from the expression pi(l - = p2(l -1/72), where s - (dq^/dp^Cp^/qJ is price 
elasticity of demand in market i. Let pi° and p| be the optimal prices chosen under 
certainty for markets 1 and 2, respectively. The export allocation (q^ql) maximizes the 
total revenue, which is the sum of areas of two trapezoids, ODCC and O'ECC, under 
the certain marginal revenue schedules. 
For the sake of argument, suppose that a risk neutral government sets the same 
price under uncertainty, pg = pg. Let qz = O'A' and q^ = O'B' be the random 






Figure 1. Ex Ante Price Setting in the Risky Market 
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The revenue from market 2 is the area O'EFA' in state z, and is the area O'EGB' in 
state -z. Thus, the expected revenue from market 2 is equal to the area O'ECC',.which 
is the revenue from market 2 under certainty. That is, expected revenue in market 2 is 
unaffected by uncertainty, regardless of the price level pg chosen ex ante.^^ 
Recall that for given price pg the marginal revenue in market 2 is evaluated at 
the random quantity, qg or qâ and is equal to ©g = Pz + fCpzVf'CPz) = a-2qg/a = - a 
+ 2pg, which is not random. Thus, for any price pg, marginal revenue ©g remains 
unaffected by the random variation of a. We have shown that since Cov(a,-©i) is 
negative optimal price pÇ must be set such that E0i(pÇ) < ©g. Linearity of the marginal 
revenue schedule ©^ implies d^©i/dqi^ = 0, and E0i(a) = ©^(Ea). Condition (4') 
holds above ©g(p^, and ©g(pg) is increasing in pg. Thus, p5 must be above p|. 
We now demonstrate that given linear marginal revenue curves, expected total 
revenue from both markets is lower than that under certainty. Since the total output for 
export Q is fixed, the random quantity supplied in market 2 results in random 
movement along the demand and marginal revenue schedules in market 1. In state z, Q 
- qg = OA' is supplied to market 1, and the corresponding marginal revenue ©t occurs 
at point A. In state -z, marginal revenue ©i is at point B. The revenue from market 1 is 
the area of the trapezoid ODAA' in state z, and is the area ODBB' in state -z. Since 
marginal revenue curves are negatively sloped, the expected revenue ER^ is less than 
the area of the trapezoid ODCC = R^ which is the revenue from market 1 under 
certainty. Since ERg is unaffected by demand uncertainty whereas ER^ is decreased, 
expected total revenue ER unambiguously declines under demand uncertainty. The 
expected welfare loss due to demand uncertainty is the difference, 
L = (l/2)[area (AA'C'C) - area (CC'B'B)] = area (AFC) 
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This loss is reduced if pg is raised above p^ which explains why the risk neutral 
government sets pl^ above pg. However, as pg increases above p^ expected total revenue 
from market 2 declines relative to its value at p|. Thus, a small increase in pg in the 
neighborhood of pg will increase expected total profit. Note that Eqg = EafCpg) = f(pg) 
< f(pD for all Pg > p^ Thus, pS > p| implies that Eqg < q|, and Eq^ > qi. 
22. Risk Aversion 
Next, consider the case where the government is risk averse. Evaluating (2) for 
a risk averse government (U" < 0) and noting f'(pg) < 0, we have 
E[U'a.(-0i + ©g)] = E(U'a).E(-0i + 0g) + Cov(U'a,-0i + 0%) = 0.(5) 
Recall that for given pg, 0g is independent of a, but 0^ is increasing in a. Note that 
d:n:/da = (pg - 0i)f(pg), which is positive if pg is set above 0^. However, the sign of 
d(U'a)/da = U"a(d;r/da) + U' is generally indeterminate even when djz/da is 
positive. Since the sign of Cov(U'a,-0i + 0%) is ambiguous, the effect of risk aversion 
on the optimal price pg is also ambiguous. That is, a risk averse government may 
charge either a higher or lower price in the risky market than a risk neutral government. 
PROPOSITION 2: Assume that a government allocates a fixed output Q between 
market 1 with certain demand and market 2 with uncertain demand and sets price in 
market 2 before observing its random demand. Then a risk averse government may not 
set a higher price in the risky market than a risk neutral government. 
22.1. Example 
We now provide a numerical example to illustrate that increased risk aversion 
does not necessarily induce the government to set a higher price in the market with 
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uncertain demand. Let qi = a - bpi and qg = a(a - bpa) be the import demand 
ûmctîons in market 1 and 2, respectively. Inverse demand functions are: Pi = (a -
qj/b, and 
p2 = [a- qj/aJ/b. Let b = 1, and let a be a binary random variable, a = 
[4/3,2/3; 1/2,1/2]. Then the expected profit is 
Ejr = E[piqi + p^q^)] = E[(a - qjqi + p2a(a - pz)]. 
The first order condition for a risk neutral government is 
E[-aQ + (l+a)a(a-p2)] = 0. 
If a = 200 and Q = 100, then pÇ = 29/19 = 152.63 and pg = 150. Thus, given a linear 
demand schedule a risk neutral government sets a higher price in the risky market than 
under certainty. The random price in market 1 is pi = [163.16,131.58; 1/2,1/2], and 
the expected price in that market is Epi = 147.37. Expected quantity supplied in 
market 2 is Eqg = 49.87, which is less than qg = 50. 
Consider a government with a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility 
function, u = The first order condition is 
E{U'«[-aQ + (l+a)a(a-p2)]} = 0. 
(.5jF/:)[.(4/3)100 + (7/3)(4/3)(200- P 2 ) ]  
+ (.5:TB- =)[. (2/3)100 + (5/3)(2/3)(200- P 2 ) ]  = 0. 
where jr* is profit when a = 4/3, and jTb is profit when a = 2/3. The optimal p5 = 151.7 
< pl^. This example illustrates that increased risk aversion does not necessarily induce 
the government to set a higher price in the market with uncertain demand than a risk 
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neutral government. Intuitively, price setting in the rislqr market creates revenue 
uncertainty in the market with certain demand. Thus, from revenue viewpoint, both 
markets are rislqr when price is set in the market with uncertain demand. 
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3. EX ANTE EXPORT ALLOCATION 
In the preceding section we considered optimal price setting policy in market 2 
before demand uncertainty is resolved. An alternative strategy for the government is to 
allocate exports between the two markets before observing the random demand. The 
inverse import demand in market 1 is p^ = k(qi), and the random import demand in 
market 2 is pg = g(Sh/<^)- The expected inverse demand in market 2 is Epg = Eg(q2/a). 
Allocation of output in the riskless market determines qz = Q - qi uniquely, 
regardless of the realized value of a. A random variation in a thus results in random 
price pz in the risky market. Specifically, the inverse import demand function in the 
risky market is rewritten 
P2 = = g(q2/«) = g[(Q - qi)/«]-
3.1. Risk Neutrality 
Consider first the case where the government is risk neutral and maximizes the 
expected export revenue, 
Br = E{[qiPi + (Q - qi)-g[(Q - qj/a]}, (6) 
The first order condition is 
3E7r/3qi = - E02(a) = 0, (7) 
where 0^ s p^(l - l/jy^) is marginal revenue in market i. Note that when q^ and qg are 
chosen, the price elasticity of demand rjz is a random variable. Since demand is random 
in market 2, for given qg marginal revenue 02(a) in market 2 is also random. In 
general 02(a) is neither concave nor convex in a. It can be shown that a sufficient 
condition for 02" < Ois that g" ^ 0 and g'" ^ 0.^^ For a linear demand function, 
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however, ©2'(a) = - 2g'q2a'^ > 0 and 02"(«) = < 0, and hence 02(a) is 
monotone increasing and concave in a. This implies that E02(a) < 02(Ea), and 0^ -
E02 > ©1 - ©2(Ea). Thus, when evaluated at and the left side of (7) is positive. 
Hence, the risk neutral government will supply more (fi above the certainty level q^. 
If a given output allocation (g is made in the rislqr market, the expected price is 
Ep2 = Eg((g/a). Since qg < q|, g(c^/a) > g(ql/a) for all a. Thus, Ep^Cc^a) > 
Ep2(q|/a). If the inverse demand function is linear, then Eg(ql/a) = E(l/a)«g(qy > 
P2(q^. Thus, Ep2((g) > P2(qD' That is, because of decreased allocation in the risky 
market under uncertainty, the expected price in the risky market will be higher than if 
the mean demand is observed with certainty. 
This analysis contrasts with the standard optimal price discrimination rule for 
the monopolist facing expected demand q2 = Ec:'f(p2) = f(p2) with certainty. Under 
certainty there is no need for a risk neutral government to discriminate between two 
markets with identical elasticities, i.e., t/i = f/z implies Pi = P2. However, given 
multiplicative disturbances in the linear demand curve, the risk neutral government 
allocates less (more) in the risky (riskless) market than under certainty. 
PROPOSITION 3: If the government is risk neutral and the import demand curve in 
the risky market is linear, then the risk neutral government allocates more export in the 
riskless market and less in the risky market than under certainty, i.e., > q^. 
3.2. Risk Aversion 
Next, consider a risk averse government that allocates exports between the two 
markets before the random demand is observed in the risky market. The expected 
utility is written 
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EU(jr) = EU[qj)i + (Q - qi)-g[(Q - q^)/a]], (8) 
The first order condition is: 3EU(jr)/3qi = E[U'(0i - ©2)] = 0. It can be rewritten as 
aEU(jr)/aqi s EU' .E(0i - ©2) + Cov(U',-02l = 0. (9) 
We now evaluate the left side of the equality in (9) at (g. Then E(©i - ©2) = 0. For 
given value  of  q j  (and  hence  q^) ,  no te  tha t  dj t /da = -  g '  >  0 ,  dU' /da = 
U"(djr/da) < 0. Moreover, dGg/da = - Zg'qjoc'^ - (qg)^ g"a'^ > 0, i.e., an increase in a 
shifts ©2 schedule upward, if g" s 0, Thus, Cov(U',-02) is positive if the inverse 
demand curve p2 is linear or concave in q2. Thus, when evaluated at ^ the left side of 
the equality in (9) is positive. This implies that expected utility is increasing in q^ when 
evaluated at q(J. That is, a risk averse government allocates more output in the riskless 
market than a risk neutral government, q' > <^. 
PROPOSITION 4: Assume that the import demand curve in the rislqr market is linear. 
Then a risk averse government allocates more output in the riskless market than a risk 
neutral government, q" > qg and qg < (g. 
3.2.1. Example 
First, consider the risk neutral case. Let q^ = a- bpi and qg = a(a - bpj) be the 
import demand functions in market 1 and 2, respectively. Inverse demand functions 
are: Pi = (a - qj/b, and Pg = [a - q2/a]/b. Let «.be a binary gamble a = 
[4/3,2/3;l/2,l/2]. For simplicity, assume that b = 1. The expected profit is 
Ejt = E[piqi + pgqg)] = E[(a - qjq^ + (a - (Q - qi)/a)(Q - qj]. 
Differentiating this with respect to q^ gives the first order condition 
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3E7r/aqi = ©i - EGgW = - 2qi + 2(Q - qj/a = 0, 
where ©i = - qi + (a - qj, and 0% = (a + qi/a - Q/a) - (Q - qj/a. Observe that 
©2'(a) 5 dGg/da = 2(Q - qja'^ > 0. 
©2"(a) = d^©2/da^= - 4 (Q - qi)a"® < 0. 
Since ©2(a) is monotone increasing and concave in a, dji(a)/dqi is monotone 
decreasing and convex in a. Thus, dEjt{a)/dqi > 3jr(Ea)/3qi, where the latter is zero 
when evaluated at q^. This implies that a risk neutral government allocates more 
output in the riskless market, ^ > qî. 
When a = 1 ± 1/3, the first order condition reduces to 
(1/2).2[(Q - qJ(3/4) - qj + (1/2).2[(Q - qJ(3/2) - qj = 0. 
Note that when a = 1, the government allocates outputs equally between the two 
markets. Under uncertainty the risk neutral government allocates ^ = (9/17)0, and qg 
= (8/17)0. This illustrates that the risk neutral government allocates more output in 
the certain market than under certainty. 
Next, consider a government with a CRRA utility function, u = The first 
order condition is E{U' «(djr/dqi)} = E{U' •[- 2qi + 2(0 - qj/a]} = 0, or 
(.5jF/'%2qi + 2(100.qJ(3/4)] 
+ (.5jrB-=)[-2qi + 2(100 - qi)(3/2)] = 0. 
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where is profit when a - 4/3, and is profit when a = 2/3. Given Q = 100, the 
optimal solution is (q^ql) = (53.17,46.83). Since q" > qg = (9/17)Q, this example 
illustrates that increased risk aversion induces the government to allocate more output 
in the riskless market. 
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4. RANKING OF PRICE AND QUANTITY SETTING POLICIES 
Our analysis was based on the assumption that the government sets either price 
or quantity in the uncertain market. In practice, the government's choice of policy 
instruments may be constrained by various aspects of market structure. We now 
investigate the ranking of two instruments for the situation where the government is not 
constrained to either price or quantity setting regimes." 
The underlying assumption about ex ante policies is that the government must 
choose either price or quantity before export demands are realized. To lay the basis for 
ranking the two ex ante policies, we consider the optimal state-contingent policies. 
Observe that the optimal state-contingent price and quantity are equivalent because 
they are chosen under conditions of certainty, i.e., after a is observed. Thus, we 
investigate the optimal state-contingent price and then use its properties to rank the ex 
ante price and quantity setting policies. 
4.1. Optimal State-Contingent Price 
The realized profit after a is observed is 
n = Pi.(Q - af(p2)) + P2«af(P2)- (10) 
Differentiating n with respect to pg gives 
ajr/3p2 = «.[- (dpi/dqi)qif' - p^f + fCpj) + Pzf] = 0. (11) 
Let p| be the optimal state-contingent price in market 2 which solves (11). 
Differentiating (11) with respect to a gives dp|/da = - ^pga/^pjpa' where for linear 
demand curves, 
f + 1) < 0, 
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= 2aff'pi > 0, 
àpl/da = - f/[(l/pi + af] > 0. (12) 
Thus, as shown in Figure 2, the optimal state-contingent price p| increases with a. 
42. Ranking of Price and Quantity Setting Policies 
If quantity setting policy is used, the government chooses optimal exports, ^  
and (g before a is observed. Let pj denote the random price associated with a given 
quantity qg. For given export qg, price in market 2 pa = g(q2/«) responds to changes in 
a. Differentiating Pa with respect to a, and using g' = l/f andqg = af gives 
dpt/da = -g'qa'a"^ = - f/af > 0. (13) 
Thus, with the quantity setting policy, pj also increases with a. Since pj < 0, dp|/da < 
dp$/da. Thus, pj schedule is steeper than the optimal state-contingent schedule pg in 
Figure 2.^* Moreover, since any given q^ is optimal for some value of a = â, the two 
curves intersect one another at some point. To the right of â, pj overshoots the optimal 
state-contingent price p| ; to the left of â, pj undershoots p|. On the other hand, when 
the optimal price pi^ or pà is set ex ante, it is independent of a. This implies that the 
ranking of price and quantity setting policies is generally indeterminate. This result is 
analogous to Fishelson and Flatters' (1975) result that when tariffs and quotas are 
chosen before foreign demands are observed, tariffs are not necessarily superior to 
quotas under uncertainty. 
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p 
cc 0 a 
Figure 2. Price Setting versus Quantity Setting Policies 
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5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
While there is substantial literature on trade restriction under uncertainty, little 
attention has been paid to the effects of risk on optimal export promotion policies. This 
paper extends Abbott, Paarlberg and Sharpies (1987), Button (1990) and Young and 
Anderson (1982) and investigates price and quantity setting policies for a large country 
disposing of a fixed quantity of surplus output to a certain and an uncertain market. 
While the literature emphasized differences in price elasticities of foreign 
import demand on export prices, we showed that risk is an important reason for price 
discrimination for foreign disposal of surplus outputs. Specifically, given linear import 
demand curves a risk neutral government sets a higher price in the uncertain market 
than if the mean demand is observed with certainty. Therefore, it is optimal even for a 
risk neutral exporter to discriminate against the market with uncertain demand. An 
important implication of the price setting policy in the risky market is that it creates 
revenue uncertainty in the market with certain demand. Thus, the effect of increased 
risk aversion on export price discrimination is ambiguous. 
When exports are allocated ex ante between two markets, the risk neutral 
exporter allocates more (less) in the riskless (risky) market than if mean demand is 
observed with certainty. Unlike the price setting case, increased risk aversion induces 
the government to allocate more in the riskless market. While price setting policies 
through export subsidies are widely used, our analysis shows that there is no a priori 
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7. FOOTNOTES 
1. First best policy is price discrimination through export taxes. However, since 
eroort taxes are forbidden by U.S. trade laws, Abbott, Paarlberg and Sharpies 
(1987) consider a constrained optimization problem in which subsidies are 
nonnegative. Most developed economies refrain from export taxes because they 
reduce export volume. 
2. Uncertainty of foreign demands may be caused by asynchronous production 
periods, or lack of information about current production conditions in import 
markets. 
3. Keynes had campaigned to create international agencies (e.g., Conunodity 
Controls) to stabilize prices of primary commodities about the "long term 
equilibrium" prices. 
4. The U.S. sales under the Export Enhancement Program was $3.3 billion in 
1988, and the export subsidy accounts roughly a quarter of that amount (Seitzinger 
and Paarlberg,1989). 
5. See Gallagher (1990) for analysis of optimal disposal of a fixed commodity 
surplus in a multimarket framework under demand certainty. 
6. In a more general framework, the government may set different producer and 
consumer prices. In this case, the quantity of export is Q(p,p,) = Y(p) - X(pc), 
where p, is consumer price of the exportable. 
7. Following Katz et al. (1982), we can ej^ress the multiplicative random variable 
a as a = /3 + Tfz, where Ez = 0, and ^ is initially assumed to be unity. Then p is 
mean of a, and hence an increase in ^ represents a spread preserving increase in 
mean (SPIM) of the inverse import demand in market 2. On the other hand, an 
increase in f represents a mean preserving spread (MPS), developed by Sandmo 
(1971). 
8. With an alternative specification, p^ = ^g(q2) with E/3 = 1, variability of 
quantity demanded increases with price. This specification is less realistic. 
9. See Baron (1970) and Sandmo (1971) for the theory of the competitive firm 
under price uncertainty. Meyer (1975) extended this analysis to monopoly facing 
demand uncertainty. Katz, Paroush and Kahana (1982) considered production and 
allocation decisions for monopoly facing certain domestic demand and uncertain 
foreign demand. 
10. If p - Pa is negative, then -Sg is an export tax. 
11. This result is due to the multiplicative shift in the linear demand schedule. 
12. Differentiating ©2 with respect to a twice gives ©2'(a) - dôj/da = -
2g'q2Û!"2 - (qg)^ g"a'\ and QzCa) = 4g'q2a'^ + Sg'Xq^^a'" + (q2rg"'a\ 
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13. See Pelcovitz (1976), and Young and Anderson (1980, 1982) for extensive 
analyses of ranking of tariffs and quotas for a small country under uncertainty. 
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Participation decisions for profit maximizing producers in voluntaiy agricultural 
commodity programs are modeled to investigate the importance of the heterogeneity of 
land attributes in the participation decision. The comparative static analysis of changes 
in program parameters on aggregate participation, acreage planted, and input use is 
completed for a corn-soybean producer. A com program participation rate equation is 
estimated using county level data for Iowa that provides support for the hypothesis that 
heterogeneity of land quality is a significant determinant in the program participation 
decision. 
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1. MOTIVATION OF RESEARCH 
Most major agricultural commodities produced in the United States are 
regulated by a variety of policy instruments that impact on production and marketing 
decisions. These include price and income support policies and production control 
polices which generally elicit different responses by individual producers and different 
responses at an aggregate level. Agricultural commodity programs in the United States 
may significantly affect the input and output decisions for each crop as well as the mix 
of commodities produced. 
A distinctive feature of U.S. agricultural commodity programs is that price 
support storage programs and acreage restriction programs are voluntary and not all 
producers participate in the programs. The participation decision of producers may be 
very sensitive to policy parameters and is thus a critical component for explaining 
individual and aggregate supply response of commodities. Recent analyses of the affect 
of govenmient programs on agricultural supply response have focused on micro-based 
producer participation decision models (Houck et al., 1976; Lee and Helmberger, 1985; 
Perry et al., 1989; deGorter and Fisher, 1989). These studies have focused on the 
affect of government programs on a "representative producer" who will decide to either 
participate or not participate on the basis of which choice will lead to higher expected 
net profit (Lee and Helmberger). The heterogeneity of producers which distinguishes 
participants from nonparticipants has been attributed to different risk attitudes 
(Kramer and Pope, 1981; Chavas and Holt, 1990), dispersion of price expectations 
among producers (Pope, 1981), differences in production technologies between farms 
(Lee and Helmberger, 1985; Whalley and Wigle, 1989), differences in attributes of land 
(Rausser, Zilberman and Just, 1984; Antle and Just, 1989), and differences in 
commodity 'tase acreage" between farms (deGorter and Fisher, 1989). Other farm 
attributes such as absolute farm size, crop rotations, on-farm feeding of com, and 
average farm yields relative to "program yields" may be significant factors in the 
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program participation decision. 
The main objective of this paper is to analyze the microeconomic factors 
affecting the participation decision under voluntary program participation. The 
theoretical model developed explicitly allows for differences in land attributes within a 
farm and between farms. The paper empirically investigates the effects of 
heterogeneity of land quality on the participation decision. 
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2. A MODEL OF CROP PRODUCTION UNDER PRICE SUPPORT 
AND ACREAGE RESTRICTION PROGRAMS 
The following is a model of individual multi-input, multi-output, crop 
production. The main factors which are hypothesized to differentiate producers are 
farm size and land quality attributes. Individual producers will have land for use in crop 
production that will vary in its productive capability. As well, the productive capability 
of land will vary across producers.^ In order to make the analysis tractable and to focus 
on the effects of heterogeneous land quality, producers are assumed to be risk-neutral, 
profit-maximizing, and to use identical technology. The micro-economic model of crop 
production determines optimal land and capital input allocation between crops as 
functions of output and input prices, government programs and the quality of the 
producer's land. 
The land managed by producers is represented as: 
Lfj where i = 1,...I represents the i'** individual producer 
j = 1,.. J represents the j'*" quality land 
k = c, s represents the crop to which the acre is planted or considered 
planted where c = com, s = soybeans. 
That is, Lfj is an acre of j"'' quality land that the i*"*" producer plants to the k'^ crop. 
The total land constraint for an individual is: 
2 Lij = 
The total acreage available for aggregate production is: 
Z  ZLi j  =  2  Ai  =  A j i J i 
The production functions are specified as additively separable, where Y^j =yj(Xij) L 
for com where yj(Xij) is the yield of a j'** quality acre, is the production of corn by 
the i"* producer on j'*" quality land, and is the capital input used in the production 
of com on the j''* acre. Production of soybeans, the production substitute crop, is 
represented as = Sj(Xij)*L 'j. Total production by the i'** producer is thus given as 
2 Yij for corn and 2 S^j for soybeans. Yields are assumed to be increasing in inputs ( 
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Yj > 0, Sj > 0), and exhibit diminishing returns in inputs ( yj < 0, Sj < 0). The total 
use of inputs is 2 X^ L ij. The presence of an acreage constraint results in jointness in 
production of com and soybeans due to allocatable fixed factors/ 
The i"* producer's optimization problem can be represented as 
| p , r ,W (1)  
where n is the producer's profit function which implicitly includes the production 
technology, p is a vector of output prices for com and soybeans, and r is a vector of 
input prices. In the absence of government programs, or for a nonparticipating 
producer, the producer's profit maximization problem can be represented as: 
En(X{„ai |p,r,L.) = ENP 
" ' =EFP2yj(Xîj)-Lrj + EFP.:|Sj(X;j)-L:j 
- r- X Xf,-L Tj - r t, • TFC (2) 
subject to : 
Vj (3) 
Vj (4) 
LTj ^ 0 V, (5) 
where: TFC = total cost of fixed inputs, 
ENP = expected nonparticipant profit, 
EFP = the expected farm price for com, 
EPFs = the expected farm price for soybeans/ 
2.1. Government Commodity Programs 
U.S. agriculture commodity programs are authorized under the Agriculture 
Adjustment Act of 1933. Specific commodity policy legislation will vary each year 
depending mainly on commodity market conditions. The provisions of commodity 
programs include price and income support for producers, and may specify acreage 
reductions (production controls) in periods when the support price is above the market 
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clearing level. A significant feature of U.S. commodity programs is that they are 
generally voluntary in nature. That is, producers make individual decisions on whether 
or not to participate in the production control programs in order to receive the program 
price support and any acreage diversion payments. Producers may decide not to 
participate in the commodity program in order to plant their entire acreage to the 
program crop or a substitute nonprogram crop.' 
2.1.1. Commodity Price Supports 
Price support is provided by the U.S. Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) 
through the use of the "nonrecourse" loan program which allows participating producers 
to place their entire production in storage at a pre-specified "loan rate", denoted P^.® 
Redeemed loans may be marketed through normal channels while "forfeited" loan 
commodity will remain in storage until prices reach pre-specified higher "release 
prices". During periods of high participation rates the loan rate will thus provide a 
"floor price" to the U.S. market. In commodities where the U.S. is a large participant in 
the world market the loan rate will also provide support prices in international trade 
(Gardner, 1987). The existence of the loan rate thus truncates the distribution of farm 
price (Eeckhoudt and Hansen, 1980). This truncation of the distribution of the random 
price will exist for both program participants and nonparticipants. While 
nonparticipants cannot place their production in the loan program, they benefit from 
the loan placements of participants as this action supports the floor price near the loan 
rate.' 
The random variable FP (farm price) can be defined with respect to P (market 
price) under the existence of commodity programs as: 
P '  i fP  ^  P^  
P  i fP  à  P"  
where the truncated cumulative probability density function, H(FP) is: 
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f G(P^) if P s 
H(FP) =\ 
I G(P) if P s P" 
and the expectation of FP (denoted EFP) for producers is: 
EFP = G(P") P ^ + JpiP'g(P) dp 
where FP is the random farm price, EFP is the expected farm price, and G(P) and g(P) 
are the cumulative and subjective probability density functions of P.® 
U.S. commodity programs also provide price support through a "target price" 
mechanism. The target price program provides annual price insurance to producers 
through "deficiency payments" to make up the per unit difference between the target 
price (P*^) and the higher of the market price or the loan rate.® The total deficiency 
payment received per acre is the per unit deficiency payment multiplied by the 
"program yield" per acre established by the government as a representative yield for the 
land. The expected deficiency payment is represented as; 
deficiency payment = {P^ - Max[ EFP,P^ ]} program yield. 
Note that the distribution function of the random FP will infer a distribution on the 
random deficiency payment. 
2.1.2. Acreage Reduction Programs 
If a commodity is receiving price support, some form of production control is 
usually necessary to moderate the production response to the program. Acreage set-
aside programs have been a major component of U.S. commodity programs. These 
programs require producers to idle land equal to a fraction of their acreage planted to 
the conmiodity in order to be eligible for price support deficiency payments and CCC 
loans. The total acreage planted and idled is limited at the level of a producer's "base 
acreage", (that acreage considered as normal plantings)." In order to induce acreage 
reductions the CCC may offer "diversion payments" for idling an additional portion of 
base acres. The acreage set-aside component of the commodity programs may be 
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represented a e [0,1], where a is the proportion of the producer's planted acreage (2 
= total planted com acres) that must be idled to participate in the commodity 
program. Thus, if a participating producer utilizes his entire base acreage in the 
program crop, a total of [o:/(l+a)]Bi acres must be idled, and [l/(l+a)]Bi acres will 
be planted to the commodity. Any diversion payments received on the diverted acres 
are represented by D, which is defined as the average diversion payment received per 
diverted acre." 
The expected total payments from price support and acreage reduction can be 
defined per diverted acre as TDP^ = [p' - max(EFP, pj^)] Y p-(l/a) + D. This is the 
expected revenue received in lieu of crop production on acreage that is idled. 
22 Program Participant Profit Maximization 
The optimization problem conditional on commodity program participation can 
be represented as: 
Max En%,Lj:j,SET,j |p,r,v,AJ = EPP = 
" " EFP- 2yj(Xfj) Lfj + TDPr SSET.j 
+ EFP. 2 Sj(X?j)-L fj -r2 XtyL t, - rZ X^j-L I - TFC(7) 
subject to: - 2 Lfj - 2 SET^ > 0(8) 
a21^j.2SETij > 0(9) 
Ly-L^j -LTj -SETi j  ^0  Vj( lO)  
LTi  ^0  Vj  (11)  
> 0 Vj (12) 
SET,J > 0 Vj(13) 
where Yp = program yield for com 
EFP = the expected farm price for corn 
EFP, = the expected farm price for soybeans 
EPP = the expected participant profit 
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TDPi = total expected program payment per set-aside acre 
Pe = the target price for com 
Pc = the loan rate for com 
V = a vector of commodity program parameters including a, Bi, D, p, 
= acres actually planted to com 
ZLfj = acres actually planted to soybeans 
SETij = the quality land set-aside for program participation 
2 SETij = total acreage set-aside for program participation 
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3. THE PARTICIPATION DECISION 
The maximization of equation (7) will yield the expected participant profit 
(EPF) and the maximization of equation (2) will yield the expected nonparticipant 
profit (ENF). A risk-neutral producer is assumed to participate in the commodity 
program if and only if EPF s ENF. 
The optimization procedure will continue over each land quality, where the 
land with lowest expected net revenue being used by participants as diversion acres. In 
particular, if the expected program payment per diverted acre is higher than the 
expected net market revenue of the land, then the producer will participate and the 
land will be diverted into set-aside acreage. This is illustrated in Figure 1 for a 
producer who has three qualities of land (L^ = low, 1^ = medium, = high quality 
land). The top panel of Figure 1 shows the relative expected returns and variable costs 
for each type of land. This translates into the expected net market returns from 
planting each type of land (for simplicity in the figure this is assumed equal for both 
crops). If the total deficiency and diversion payments per unit of diverted acre (denoted 
TOP) equal TDFi then the producer v/ill set-aside his land but will not be 
constrained by base acreage. The producer will set-aside L^, will plant (l/a)-L ^ acres 
of Lh and land to com, and the remainder into soybeans. If the payments per 
diverted acre are TDPg the base acreage constraint will just be binding and the 
producer will set-aside and L^, acres equal to [a/(l+a)]Bi, will plant [1/(1+a)]Bi 
acres of and 1^ to com, and acres to soybeans. When the payments are at a 
high level, such as TDF3, rents will accme to the base acreage constraint but the 
acreage allocation will not change relative to the TDPg case. Note that another 
producer with uniform land quality, equal to L^, but otherwise having identical 
characteristics, would not participate in the program if program payments per diverted 
acre were TDPi, and would be indifferent to participation given TDPg. This 
demonstrates that land quality within farms differentiates participants from 
nonparticipants. The existence of low quality land on a farm makes participation more 
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profitable than nonparticipation. As Figure 1 indicates, if the program payment per 
diverted acre is high enough all producers can be enticed into participation. 
The. effect of the government commodity program on aggregate corn supply 
response is illustrated in Figure 2. The earliest entrants into the feedgrains program (as 
price declines from levels where participation is non-optimal for all producers) are 
those producers with low marginal cost of meeting the set-aside acreage requirement, 
i.e., producers that can use low quality land for the set-aside requirement. Thus, the 
supply effect of the initial participants is not as large as the marginal supply effect of the 
last producers drawn into the program at price This effect contributes to the 
slippage coefficient of commodity programs." The current modelling of the 
participation decision incorporating land quality would indicate that the aggregate 
supply under government programs may be more responsive to price than in the 
absence of a government program. 
The government commodity program also provided incentives to producers to 
have low quality land incorporated into their base acreage to reduce the costs of 
participation. These land use adjustments made by producers made the supply control 
aspects of the commodity programs less effective and contributed to the "slippage" in 
the programs. Any increases in the slippage coefficient would lead to increased 
effective costs of achieving the same supply reduction unless the government adjusted 
its payments to producers in recognition of the higher slippage. 
3.1. Comparative Statics 
The comparative statics for the individual with respect to key program 
parameters can be performed on the function G = EPF - ENP, where G > 0 for 
participants, G < 0 for nonparticipant producers, and G = 0 for producers indifferent 
to participation. Note that iff dG/dz = 0 for parameter z, will a change in z have no 
effect on the program participation decision. If dG/dz > (<) 0, evaluated at G = 0, 
then an increase in the parameter z would make program participation more (less) 
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increased (decreased) program participation. 
For simplification, the producer will be assumed to have two land qualities (Li 
is low quality, Ly is high quality). Let T equal the total deficiency and diversion 
payments per acre of com planted, where T = {[pc - max(EFP,pe)l'Y p + aD}, and 
TDP is the total deficiency and diversion payments per diverted acre, where TDP = 
(l/a)*T. The subscript for the i"* producer will be suppressed for notational 
convenience. 
3.1.1. The Affect of an Increase in Target Price or Diversion Pavments 
An increase in the target price or diversion payments will be considered 
together as they bath act to increase the total program payments per acre planted to 
com (dT/dpc = Y,, dT/dD = a). Thus, an increase in the target price or diversion 
payments will not decrease participation as: 
dG/dp: = Yp.(LI+LD>0. 
dG/dD = a-(L I + > 0. 
In the current formulation of the model, producers do no view the target price as the 
price for marginal production. Thus, changes in the target prices or diversion payments 
do not induce changes in marginal input use for the producer. For a participant 
producer with a binding base acreage constraint, the increase in target price will only 
affect EPF, not acreage allocations. For the partial participant, the increase in target 
price will increase the incentive to participate more fully. 
3.1.2. The Effect of an Increase in the Loan Rate 
An increase in the loan rate p, will lead to a decrease in the expected 
deficiency payment per planted acre of com as: 
dT/dpJ = -H(pJ)-Y , < 0 
The increase in the loan rate will also lead to an increase in the expected farm price as: 
dEFP/dp^ = H(pb > 0. 
Thus, the effect on the participation decision will be determined as the sign of: 
dG/dp; = -H(pJ) Y , (LÎ + m- + H(pJ) (y .14 +yHW - H(pb (y ,LÎ 
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, where acreages superscripted with p and n refer to participant and nonparticipant 
respectively. If Yp 2: (y^LI +yhLS)V(Li + m*" then the expression is unambiguously 
negative and an increase in the loan rate will decrease participation. This is due to the 
decline in program payments per planted acre not being fully compensated by increased 
market returns through higher expected farm price. The increase in EFP for 
nonparticipants will tend to decrease participation. For most reasonable values of 
participant and nonparticipant acreage evaluated at G = 0, the expression will be 
negative and increases in the loan rate, that increase the price floor for nonparticipants, 
will negatively affect participation. Alternately, decreases in the loan rate will lower the 
effective price floor for the market and induce increased program participation. 
As an increase in the loan rate will increase the expected farm price for 
participants and nonparticipants, profît maximizing producers will increase nonland 
input use as the loan rate increases. That is, as the loan rate increases, input use will 
increase to equate expected marginal revenue with the marginal input cost. 
3.1.3. The Effect of an Increase in the Set-aside Parameter a 
An increase in a will increase the cost to the producer of participating in the 
program due to lost production net revenue on the increased acreage diversion. The 
producer is not compensated by increased total diversion payments (if total deficiency 
and diversion payments are assumed fixed)." It will affect the participation decision as: 
dG/da = .[p^.max(EFP, pb] Y ,(!/« ^)(SETi + SETJ 
- ©i(Ll + W + 0ia-(SET 1 + SETJ, 
where represents the shadow value of the set-aside acreage constraint (which 
represents excess payment per diverted acre above its expected value in production), 
and ©i is the shadow value of the base acreage constraint (representing the value of 
acreage in com production). Thus, if the decrease in payments per set-aside acre plus 
the lost com acreage revenues are higher (lower) than excess payment over the 
productive value of the land that would be diverted, an increase in the set-aside 
requirement would tend to decrease (increase) participation. That is, if the increase in 
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the set-aside requirement makes the expected productive value of the land higher than 
the set-aside payment per acre (assuming 0^ = 0) the producer will not participate. 
3.1.4. The Effect of an Increase in Base Acreage B 
An increase in the base acreage constraint for producers will increase the 
allowable com planted acreage for participating producers. The effects of an increase 
in B on the participation decision are as follows: 
dG/dB = 0 à 0. 
If 0 = 0, i.e. the base acreage constraint is not binding for a participant, an increase in 
B will have no impact on the participation decision or on the optimal allocation of land 
and non-land inputs. If the base acreage is a constraint, i.e., 0 > 0, then an increase in 
base acreage will increase the incentive to participate in the government program and, 
ceteris paribus, will increase com planted acreage and reduce soybean planted 
acreage.^* 
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4. EMPIRICAL MODEL OF CORN PROGRAM PARTICIPATION 
The firm level supply of agricultural commodities with govermnent programs 
and allocatable fixed factors has been analyzed in a static framework where land quality 
differences distinguish participant producers from nonparticipants. Previous studies 
have aggregated across representative producers to form an aggregate supply function 
for the commodities. The individual aggregate supply functions are conditional on the 
producers' participation decisions. This discrete participation decision by producers 
makes the mapping from the individual supply function into the aggregate supply 
function very complicated. In order to assess the impact of a parameter change on the 
aggregate supply, the impact of the parameter change on the individual program 
participation decisions must be determined. Then the impact of the parameter change 
on the individual conditional supply functions can be calculated and summed over 
producers to calculate the aggregate effect of the parameter change. 
Previous studies have used the ad hoc concept of a participation rate function 
(R), that determines the average participation of all producers at given parameter 
levels (deGorter and Paddock, 1985; Aradhyula, 1989). R is assumed to be a function 
of the relative profitability of participation as: 
R = f[EPP-ENP] = fIP,v,L,r], 
where P is a vector of expected output prices, vis a vector of government program 
parameters, Lis a matrix of land attributes, and r is a vector of input prices. This 
participation rate function has then been estimated for the aggregate by a logistic 
function (Aradhyula) or in linear form (deGorter and Paddock). 
4.1. Empirical Investigation of the Importance of Land Quality on Program Participation 
While previous studies have hypothesized on the importance of land quality 
variability for the participation decision (Rausser, Zilberman, and Just, 1984; Antle and 
Just, 1989), this relationship has never been examined empirically. The county level 
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corn program participation rate function for Iowa will be estimated to test the 
importance of land quality attributes in the conmiodity program participation decision. 
The county aggregate participation rate in the com program, R, is assumed to 
be a function of farm program parameters, the expected level of com yields, and the 
variation of the expected level of com yields among producers in the same county. This 
relationship can be expressed as: 
Ri = f[2a„A„ + i8Qi + -ya 1 ] 
where Ri is the i*^** county participation rate. 
An are n program parameters, 
Qi is the average land quality for the i"'* county, and 
(7i is the variation of expected yield for the i*^^ county. 
It is expected a priori that the average land quality will have a negative impact on 
program participation (fi ^ 0 as greater average productivity of land will be a 
disincentive to participation). The variation of the expected yield is expected to have a 
positive effect on participation as the larger is the variability the larger is the amount of 
lower quality land to use for the acreage reduction requirement. 
The estimation of the participation rate should constrain R^ e [0,1]. The 
participation rate equation is hypothesized to be as follows: 
Ri = 1 - exp(-{2 On An + )9Yi + I}) 
n 
The form of this participation rate function is illustrated in Figure 3. This equation is 
non-linear in parameters but can be transformed to allow for estimation of a linear 
equation as follows: 
CORNRi = A„ + y3Yi + raf} 
where CORNRi = - log(l - Ri). 
42 Data 
Annual crop year data for Iowa counties were used in the estimation. The 
sample period covers the 1982/83 to 1988/89 crop years. This allows 693 observations 
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provided by program compliance records for corn at the Iowa Agricultural Stabilization 
and Conservation Service (ASCS) state office. The average com program compliance 
rates for Iowa counties for the 1982 -1988 period are illustrated in Figure 4. The 
participation rates are grouped in quartiles and shows that the highest average rates of 
program participation have been in the Central and North Central regions of Iowa. 
County level data on planted acreage, program base acreage, participation rates, 
program yields, mandatory acreage reduction acres, and paid land diversion acreage is 
available from this ASCS data. 
A USDA ASCS Participation Worksheet File for 1987 details the total base 
acreage by county, the participating base acreage, the paid diversion acreage, and the 
land in the Acreage Reduction Program (ARP). The data set also contains information 
on the mean yield by county and the coefficient of variation of yield for each county. 
This yield information is utilized as a proxy for the land attributes of each county. This 
data set is available for the state of Iowa for the year 1987. 
Output price data are available for com and soybeans at the county level from 
ASCS sources in the form of loan rates, posted county prices for loan redemption, and 
average daily prices. The ec ante nature of the decision process requires that expected 
output prices be collected for outputs. These can be constructed on a county level by 
subtracting the expected county basis from the spring price of average crop year futures 
contract prices. The expected farm price is calculated using the average March-May 
Chicago futures price of the December futures contract for com and the November 
futures contract for soybeans. The expected county basis is assumed to be the realized 
county basis for the previous crop year for the relevant futures contract. 
The Com Suitability Rating (CSR) is used as an index of soil productivity for 
Iowa counties. The CSR provides a relative ranking of all soils mapped in the state of 
Iowa based on their use in row-crop production. CSRs are primarily used to quantify 
the diKerences in productivity potential between tracts of land. The Com Suitability 
Ratings for Iowa counties is Illustrated in Figure 5. 
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Figure 4. Average Corn Program Participation Rates for Iowa Counties (1982 -1988) 
Figure 5. Corn Suitability Ratings for Iowa Counties 
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Data on cost of production of com for 1987 by county for Iowa were obtained 
from Iowa State University extension bulletins. The cost of diverting acres to comply 
with program requirements was also obtained from this source. The cost of production 
data is indexed across the crop years using an index of cash expenses obtained from 
USDA. 
A summaiy of the aggregate data is presented in Table 1. 
Estimated Program Participation Rate Equations 
Empirical estimation has been performed on the participation rate equation 
specified as: 
CORNRi = (Ci.INVCSRi + C^-a ^ + C3.INVSOY1 + Q.DUM83 + 
C5.DUM85)-G i 
where: CORNR^ = - log(l - R^), 
INVCSRi = the inverse of the com suitability rating for county i, 
(Ti = the standard deviation of the yields for county i, 
INVSOYi = the inverse of the expected soybean price for the i''^ 
county, 
Gi = EPPi - ENPi = the expected gain from participation in county i 
DUM83 = a dummy variable for the 1983 com program 
DUM85 = a dummy variable for the 1985 com program 
This specification ensures that when Gi = 0, i.e., no expected increase in profitability 
from participation in the corn program, the participation rate will be zero, and as G^ 
becomes large the participation rate will limit to 1. It is hypothesized that the com 
program participation rate will be negatively related to the expected soybean price. 
The Com Suitability Rating is expected to be negatively related to the participation rate 
as greater average productivity of land is a disincentive to participation. The inverse of 
the expected soybean price and the inverse of the Com Suitability Rating (CSR) are 
used to ensure that the function is bounded from above and below. A dummy variable 
was included for 1983 due to the existence of the whole farm Payment-in-Kind (PIK) 
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Table 1. Summary Data on U.S. Corn Program 
Crop Year 
ÎM 12S2 12S2 J284 1285 xm 1987 1988 
Target Price $/bu. 2.70 2.86 3.03 3.03 3.03 3.03 2.93 
Loan Rate^ $/bu. 2.55 2.65 2.55 2.55 1.84 1.82 1.77 
ARP % 10 10 10 10 17.5 20 20 
Paid Div.^ (mandatory) % 0 10 0 0 2.5 
0 0 
Exp. Def. Pmt. $/bu. 0.15 0.21 0.48 0.43 1.19 1.21 1.10 
Diversion Pmt. $/bu 0 1.47 0 0 0.73 0.59 1.75 
Iowa Part. % 37.4 78.9 68.0 75.3 93.5 91.9 93.7 
Min. Cty. Part.® % 11 51 37 64 83 72 78 
Max. Cty. Part.<^ % 67 100 88 95 100 98 99 
Exp. Com Price^ $/bu 2.50 2.77 2.71 2.38 1.78 1.58 2.00 
Exp. Soyb. Price*^ $/bu 5.93 6.21 6.92 5.75 5.86 4.75 6.59 
Cash Exp. Index % 1.21 1.137 1.191 1.128 0.967 1.00 1.02 
^The 1986 loan rate is net of the 4.3% Gramm-Rudman reduction. The 1987-
1990 loan rates are the Findley Amendment loan rates. 
^The 1983 program included a 10-30% PIK program and an all base 0/92 
proCTam. Provision for a 50/92 option was included m the 1985 Farm Bill and was used 
m 1986. A 0/92 option was available for producers in 1988. 
^TTie minimum and maximum compliance rates for Iowa counties in the corn 
program. 
^The planting period expected average com and soybean price for Iowa. 
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INVCSR 0.514 0.070 7.33 
0.00129 0.00012 10.44 
INVSOYi 0.0427 0.0056 7.62 
DUM83 0.0293 0.0012 23.99 
DUM85 0.01687 0.00091 18.45 
Constant Rho = 0.175 
Raw-Moment R^ = 0.953 
Log of the Likelihood Function = -455.6 
Regression Sum of Squares = 3890.8 
Total Sum of Squares = 4082.3 
Source: estimated. 
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option available in that year. The decline of on-farm com prices below loan rate levels 
for many months of the 1982/83 marketing year may also have affected the 1983 
participation decisions (Menzie and Van Meir, 1988). A dummy variable was also 
included for 1985 due to the extreme financial stress in this year, as measured by the 
peak of the debt/asset ratios, and the high degree of uncertainty surrounding the loan 
rate levels in the 1985 Farm Bill. 
The equation was estimated using data on the 99 counties in Iowa for the 
period 1982/83 to 1988/89, i.e., 693 observations of county level participation. A mixed 
estimation procedure combining the cross-section and time series data was employed. 
Several tests were conducted to determine the presence of autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity in the residuals of the estimated equation. The tests are presented in 
Table 2. 
Table 3. Tests for Heteroskedasticitv and Autocorrelation 
Test Log-Likelihood v^-Value dX Result 
1. Null Hypothesis 















-397.716 406.68 198 reject null 
-455.60 
-397.716 115.8 99 accept null 
-487.48 
-455.60 63.76 1 reject null 
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The hypothesis of no autocorrelation and no heteroskedasticity is rejected at 
the 95% level of confidence. A test of the hypothesis of the same level of 
autocorrelation for all counties, i.e., the same rho for all 99 counties, resulted in 
accepting the null hypothesis of the same rho for all counties. The test of the null 
hypothesis of no autocorrelation, conditional on the presence of heteroskedasticity, is 
also rejected at the 95% level of confidence. The Generalized Least Squares procedure 
is therefore employed to estimate the participation rate function, allowing for 
heteroskedastic error variances and autocorrelation. 
The results of the Generalized Least Squares (GLS) estimation procedure are 
presented in Table 3. The estimated coefficients for all the variables are positive as 
hypothesized. The coefficients for the CSR and the standard deviation of yields are 
significantly different from zero at the 95% level of confidence. The coefficient for the 
effect of the soybean price on the com program participation is significant at the 95% 
level of confidence. 
In the heteroskedastic case there is no unique measure of goodness of fit. The 
Raw-Moment = 0.95 indicates that the variables explain a high degree of the 
variability of program participation between Iowa counties and across years. 
The Baxter-Cragg pseudo R^ is calculated for the estimated regression as 
follows: 
Pseudo R^ = 1 - exp[ 2 (L^ - Ly,^)/K ], where Lo is the log likelihood function 
when only a constant is used, L^ax is the maximized value of the log likelihood function 
when all parameters are allowed to vary, and K is the total number of observations. A 
pseudo R^ = 0.75 indicates that the model performs well in explaining the participation 
decisions between Iowa counties and across time. Calculating the coefficient of 
determination as the square of the Pearson correlation coefficient between the 
predicted participation rates and the actual rates yields an R^ = 0.85. 
The estimated coefficients for the participation rate equation can be used to 
calculate the elasticities. These implied elasticities are dependent on the level of 
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participation and as the participation rate approaches unity, the elasticity will go to 
zero. Calculated at the mean values the elasticity of the participation rate with respect 
to changes in the Com Suitability Rating is -0.105. The elasticity of the participation 
rate with respect to the standard deviation of yields is 0.113. The elasticity of the 
participation rate with respect to the expected on-farm soybean price is -0.094. The 
variable with the largest impact on participation is the expected net profitability from 
participation, i.e., G = EPF - ENP. The elasticity of participation with respect to 
expected net profitability from participation is 0.368. That is, as the expected net 
profitability from participation increases by \% in the neighborhood of the mean, either 
from increases in the target price, loan rates, and diversion payments, or by decreases in 
acreage set-aside requirements, the participation rate will increase by 0.368%. The 
elasticity estimates for all independent variables appear reasonable when evaluated at 
the mean values. 
Examination of the errors of the regression shows that the predicted 
participation rates for the base period are on average below the actual participation 
rates. The mean error of the regression for the 1982 to 1988 crop years is -0.022 and 
the mean percent error is -3.42%. The root mean square percentage error of 16% 
indicates that the model is performing reasonably well. The Theil U coefficient for the 
historical simulation is 0.056. The forecast mean squared error decomposition indicates 
a prediction bias proportion of 0.059, a variance proportion of 0.11, and a covariance 
proportion of 0.83. 
Examination of the prediction errors by county reveals that the prediction 
errors are geographically related. The average prediction errors for 1982 -1988 are 
illustrated by county in Figure 6. The counties in South Central Iowa and those in 
Northeast Iowa bordering on the Mississippi River, were generally overpredicted by the 
model. Also, three counties in the extreme northwest of Iowa are overpredicted on 
average. These counties in general have lower average rates of participation in the corn 
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participation than the model predicts. This may be due to the lower average farm size, 
crop rotations, or livestock concentration in these counties. Another factor may be the 
higher than average debt/asset ratios for farms in these counties (0.46 debt/assets for 
these regions in 1985 compared to a 0.26 debt/asset ratio for Central Iowa). 
Particularly through the period 1982 to 1988 the level of financial stress on producers 
would make them more averse to low levels of crop revenue and program participation 
may have been a condition for production credit extension by lenders. 
The counties in Southwest and Central Iowa tend to be underpredicted on 
average. These are counties with generally higher average program participation rates 
over the 1982 -1988 period. The large farm size in Central Iowa and the specialization 
in crop production versus mixed farming may be a factor in this underprediction. 
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5. SUMMARY AND LIMITATIONS 
The participation decision for the U.S. voluntary com program was modelled 
for risk-neutral, profit maximizing producers with identical production technology but 
heterogeneous land quality. The heterogeneity of land quality is illustrated as a 
possible determinant which differentiates program participants from nonparticipants. 
The empirical estimation of the com program participation for Iowa counties for the 
1982 to 1988 period indicates that land quality is a significant factor in explaining 
differences in participation between counties. The expected net profitability of 
participation, however, has the largest relative impact on the county participation rate 
(measured at the mean values). 
The results indicate that the distribution of farm program participation is 
affected by the availability of low quality land to use for the acreage set-aside 
requirement. In the pre-1985 Farm Bill setting producers with low quality land on their 
farms were able to increase the amount of low quality land in their base acreage and 
thus make participation less costly. The design of the U.S. commodity programs did not 
account for heterogeneity of land quality in set-aside acres. This appears to have 
contributed to the slippage in U.S. commodity supply control efforts. The land use 
decisions of producers and the distribution of farm program benefits appears to have 
been significantly affected by the design of the commodity programs. 
The nonavailability of farm level data for use in econometric estimation or 
simulation of the model is a severe constraint in testing the theoretical model. A data 
set that provides the desired data, including proxies for some variables can only be 
constructed at a county level. Several aspects affecting an individual producers 
participation decision such as on-farm feeding of corn, farm size impacts on program 
payments, differences in production technology, crop rotation constraints, and 
differences in risk attitudes are not accounted for in the analysis. The effect of current 
participation decisions on a producer's future participation is also not factored into the 
empirical model. 
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Other limitations to the estimation exercise stem from the inherent 
simultaneity of the producer participation decision with all other variable choices. That 
is, participation is decided simultaneously with land use, input use, and crops seeded. 
Thus, the cost of production of com is a function of the participation decision. This 
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7. FOOTNOTES 
1. The assumption of heterogeneous land quality was used by Rausser, Zilberman, and Just 
(1984) to analyze the distributional effects of government programs in agriculture. 
2. The assumption is that land use for an individual producer is constrained to the total 
farm acreage. If an individual rents additional acreage it is very likely that they will rent 
a full farm unit which will have its own commodity program parameters (i.e., base acres). 
The producer is likely to maximize on the rented farm independently of the participation 
decision made on the owned land. A producer need not participate on all farm units under 
their control, but producers do face a total farm program payment limitation (the 1989 
level is $50,000) which may affect the participation decisions across farm units. Perry et 
al. (1989) indicate that payment limitations may not be a significant factor for most 
producers. This may be attributed to strategic farm ownership structuring in the 1980's that 
was designed specifically to circumvent the payment limitation. The assumption of an 
acreage restriction was used by Lee and Helmberger (1985). Note that the model cannot 
explain land rental decisions, as all producers are identical except for the quality of land 
utilized. 
3. Moschini (1989) has shown that in the normal case, the jointness in production will imply 
that the marginal cost of any output will rise when any other output is increased and that 
the supply of any output decreases when any other output price increases. Also, an input 
price increase may lead to the supply of some outputs to rise. 
4. The soybean expected farm price has a probability density ftmction truncated from below 
by the soybean loan rate. The soybean loan rate is an effective price floor in that all 
producers are automatically eligible for the CCC loan program. There is no acreage set-
aside requirement for soybean producers and they receive no deficiency payments on 
planted acreage, i.e. there is no target price for soybeans. 
5. For a more complete explanation of U.S. commodity programs see Lee and Helmberger 
(1985) or Houck et al. (1976). 
6. The CCC loans are non-recourse in the sense that to remove liability for the loan, 
producers may redeem the loans at the CCC loan rate (plus interest charges) or forfeit the 
commodity in storage. 
7. During periods of high program participation the non-participants are likely to have a 
secure loan rate price floor. An exception to this rule of thumb is given by years with high 
payment-in-kind (PIK) certificates in circulation (1986 and 1987) that resulted in many 
program commodity prices falling below loan rate levels despite hi^ rates of participation. 
Periods of low program participation are likely to coincide with a Wgh relative price of the 
program crop (Lee and Helmberger) and thus the loan rate price support is not in 
jeopardy. 
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8. The expected farm price (EFP) is increasing in the loan rate (dEFP/dP^ = H(P^) 
> 0). 
9. Note that EFP ^ po and in general the strict inequality holds. Thus, the max(EFP, 
Pc') = EFP. 
10. In Farm Bill legislation prior to the 1985 Farm Bill "base acreage" for an individual 
producer was determined for each commodity as a rolling five year average of acreage 
"planted and considered planted" to the commodity. The 1985 Farm Bill has limited the 
upward flexibility of the base acreage. Note that acreage base that is idled under a 
commodity program either as mandatory diversion or voluntary paid diversion is 
considered planted to that commodity. 
11. This is an abstraction from the program in that the decision for voluntaiy paid diversion 
is made conditional on the decision to participate in the program. If voluntary diversion 
payments per diverted acre are greater than the expected deficiency payment per acre of 
mandatory diversion, the producer may or may not participate in the voluntary diversion. 
The decision depends on the expected net productive value of the additional acres that 
would have to be diverted. Note that these acres would be of equal or higher quality land 
than the mandatory diversion acres. If the additional acres that would be diverted are of 
significantly higher quality a participating producer may choose not to enroll in the 
voluntary diversion. Also note Ôiat if the diversion payment were higher than the expected 
deficiency payment per mandatory diversion acre, this could lead to additional 
participation as producers who did not find it optimal to participate only for the deficiency 
payment may now find it optimal to participate in order to enroll in the paid diversion 
program. 
12. Gardner (1987) identified slippage as an increase in average yields on a farm as the 
lowest quality land is diverted. Tlie sDppage coefficient is defined by Gardner to be equal 
to {1- (% change in output)/(% acreage reduction)}. 
13. Note that when both mandatory acreage diversion and voluntary paid diversion 
programs are operative, an increase in a through an increase in the mandatory acreage 
requirement will decrease TDP (TDP is the program payment per acre diverted). An 
increase in a through an increase in voluntary paid diversion will increase TDP. The 
analysis assumes that the increase in a is accomplished through an increase in both 
diversion programs such that TDP remains constant. 
14. deGorter and Fisher (1989) hypothesize that as producers can increase their future 
base acreage through current period high com acreage, they may find current period non-
participation and future period participation optimal for multi-period profit maximization. 
This hypothesis is only valid prior to the 1985 Farm Bill, which limited increases in base 
acreage. 
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GENERAL SUMMARY 
The results indicate that U.S. wheat exports increased by 31 million bushels in 
1986/87 because of the wheat EEP, while actual EEP shipments were estimated to be 
245 million bushels. Thus, the additionalily (i.e., increase in U.S. exports above what 
would have occurred in the absence of the program) was 13 percent (31 million 
bushels) and commercial displacement was 87 percent (214 million bushels). The 
estimated cost of the EEP shipment subsidies for 1986/87 was $224 million (estimated 
by EEP contract announcement data and trade reported prices). This figure is the gross 
subsidy outlay and does not account for changes in carrying costs due to reduced wheat 
stocks or changes in CCC program costs due to changes in the U.S. farm price for 
wheat. Although the size of the EEP varied over the three-year period, the estimated 
percentage of additionality remained relatively constant at 8 - 13 percent. In 1987/88 
with 1,016 million bushels of EEP shipments, only 83 million bushels were estimated as 
additionality. 
The EEP has had a noticeable impact on U.S. ending stocks, export levels and 
export market shares, U.S. farm price, and the U.S. Gulf Port Price for wheat. In all 
years, 1986/87 to 1988/89, the price impact of the EEP-induced increased demand for 
U.S. exports has outweighed the U.S. domestic supply effect (due to increased PIK 
certificates), resulting in a higher U.S. wheat price. This supports the view that the EEP 
tended to exaggerate the impact of the 1988 drought-reduced wheat supply in the U.S. 
The U.S. Gulf wheat price increased by US$ 6.76 per MT in 1987/88 and US$ 2.39 per 
MT in 1988/89 due to the EEP. 
The results indicate only a minor negative impact of the EEP on exports from 
Canada, Australia, and Argentina. Wheat production levels in these countries also 
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showed a minor negative impact of the EEP. The European Community, with a price 
transmission elasticity of zero due to its variable import levy system of price supports, 
does not respond to the EEP in terms of total export volume. The EEC export of wheat 
was moderately displaced in certain Middle East markets, but increased exports to the 
USSR and other countries have resulted in no significant reductions in EEC total 
exports. The overall net wheat trade increased 0.7 MMT in 1986/87,1.7 MMT in 
1987/88, and 1.7 MMT in 1988/89 due to the wheat EEP. 
In summary, the analysis using the annual world wheat trade model indicates 
that the wheat EEP has expanded U.S. exports and caused a decline in Canadian, 
Australian, and Argentine wheat exports. The export additionality of the program is 
estimated at 8-13 percent over the period 1986/87 to 1988/89 (Table 8). These results 
are generally lower than to those determined in other studies. Hillberg (1988), using a 
quarterly, spatial equilibrium model of world wheat trade, reported EEP additionality 
ranging from 10 percent (October 1985-March 1986) to 17-20 percent (April/June 
1987). Bailey (1988) reported export additionality at a high of 58 percent for 1986/87 
to 14 percent for 1987/88. The incorporation of a nonpassive price response by all 
other exporters in response to EEP subsidies is the major determinant that would 
explain the lower estimates of export additionality. In particular, while Bailey (1988) 
calculated large export additionality for 1986/87, the current study was unable to 
confirm high export additionality for the EEP in any year. 
The analysis suggests that the ability of the EEP to expand U.S. exports (rather 
than to change the market composition of U.S. exports) is limited by retaliatory price 
responses of competing exporters. The effectiveness of the EEP to increase U.S. wheat 
exports has been moderated by the domestic policies of most major wheat importers 
and exporters, which decrease the domestic price transmission elasticities with respect 
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to import prices. U.S. export expansion since 1985/86 is attributable mainly to U.S. 
loan rate reductions, production conditions and domestic policies of major importing 
(USSR, China) and exporting (Canada) countries. Examination of the EEP with 
respect to its initial stated objectives suggests that the goals of additionality and cost 
effectiveness are not being met. 
While there is substantial literature on trade restriction under uncertainty, little 
attention has been paid to the effects of risk on optimal export promotion policies. This 
paper extends Abbott, Paarlberg and Sharpies (1987), Button (1990) and Young and 
Anderson (1982) and investigates price and quantity setting policies for a large country 
disposing of a fixed quantity of surplus output to a certain and an uncertain market. 
While the literature emphasized differences in price elasticities of foreign 
import demand on export prices, we showed that risk is an important reason for price 
discrimination for foreign disposal of surplus outputs. Specifically, given linear import 
demand curves a risk neutral government sets a higher price in the uncertain market 
than if the mean demand is observed with certainty. Therefore, it is optimal even for a 
risk neutral exporter to discriminate against the market with uncertain demand. An 
important implication of the price setting policy in the rislqr market is that it creates 
revenue uncertainty in the market with certain demand. Thus, the effect of increased 
risk aversion on export price discrimination is ambiguous. 
When exports are allocated ex ante between two markets, the risk neutral 
exporter allocates more (less) in the riskless (risky) market than if mean demand is 
observed with certainty. Unlike the price setting case, increased risk aversion induces 
the government to allocate more in the riskless market. While price setting policies 
through export subsidies are widely used, our analysis shows that there is no a priori 
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reason for preference of price (or export subsidy) setting policy over export allocation 
policy. 
The participation decision for the U.S. voluntary com program was modelled 
for risk-neutral, profit maximizing producers with identical production technology but 
heterogeneous land quality. The heterogeneity of land quality is illustrated as a 
possible determinant which differentiates program participants from non-participants. 
The empirical estimation of the com program participation for Iowa counties for the 
1982 to 1988 period indicates that land quality is a significant factor in explaining 
differences in participation between counties. The expected net profitability of 
participation, however, has the largest relative impact on the county participation rate 
(measured at the mean values). 
The nonavailability of farm level data for use in econometric estimation or 
simulation of the model is a severe constraint in testing the theoretical model. A data 
set that provides the desired data, including proxies for some variables can only be 
constructed at a county level. Several aspects affecting an individual producers 
participation decision such as on-farm feeding of com, farm size impacts on program 
payments, differences in production technology, crop rotation constraints, and 
differences in risk attitudes are not accounted for in the analysis. The effect of current 
participation decisions on a producer's future participation is also not factored into the 
empirical model. 
Other limitations to the estimation exercise stem from the inherent 
simultaneity of the producer participation decision with all other variable choices. That 
is, participation is decided simultaneously with land use, input use, and crops seeded. 
Thus, the cost of production of corn is a function of the participation decision. This 
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